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I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States now there is a gap between what the public
expects of its President and how the courts treat executive officers.
Presidents, of course, like to declare that elections are about “values,”
and one supposes they would not keep saying so unless a fair portion
of the electorate agreed. Even legal academics increasingly say that
the executive may be the best place for protecting certain constitutional values, like federalism, or more generally for representing national norms of justice above the more parochial concerns of congressmen.1

* A.B. Harvard, J.D. Columbia. Appellate attorney, U.S. Department of Justice. I
am grateful for the many helpful comments and suggestions I have received from readers,
including John Bronsteen, Mike Dorf, Brandon Garrett, Robert Katzmann, Carlton Larson,
Tom Merrill, Bernadette Meyler, Trevor Morrison, Michael Stokes Paulsen, Susan Sturm,
Mark Tushnet and Robert Weisberg. Of course, any errors are mine, and the views here
are mine alone and not those of the United States or of the Justice Department.
1. See Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 2027, 2149-50 (2002); Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should
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Unsurprisingly, then, we now see that executive constitutional interpretation, and executive ideals, of justice are at the center of difficult controversies. The Department of Defense is deciding what process is due for alleged enemy combatants.2 The Environmental Protection Agency is deciding whether federal regulation of certain waterways would infringe on state land-use prerogatives.3 The Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) uses the Constitution as a baseline for deciding when nonprofit entities are acting against “public policy,”4 as
some argue they do when they engage in lobbying activities.5 The
Drug Enforcement Agency has attempted to define “appropriate”
medical care to exclude physician-assisted suicide.6 And nearly every
agency prohibits those who receive agency funds from carrying out
policies that have a disparate impact on racial minorities, despite the
fact that the Supreme Court has said that such policies do not violate
the Constitution.7
Courts seem confused about how to review these executive decisions, or indeed whether to permit them at all.8 The confusion results
from a collision between two trains of Supreme Court thought. From
one direction, there is the legal realist view that assigning legal

Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
ANTHOLOGY 20, 26 (Thomas O. Sargentich ed., 1994); John O. McGinnis, Presidential Review as Constitutional Restoration, 51 DUKE L.J. 901, 903-04, 926, 928-29 (2001).
2. John Mintz, U.S. Outlines Plan for Detainee Review, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2004, at
A10.
3. See, e.g., National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Proposed Regulations to Establish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Phase III Facilities, 69 Fed. Reg. 68,444, 68,454 (Envtl. Prot. Agency Nov. 24, 2004) (giving individual
field offices authority to determine whether regulated waterway is within constitutional
reach of the EPA’s Clean Water Act jurisdiction); Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
on the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 68 Fed.
Reg. 1991 (Envtl. Prot. Agency Jan. 15, 2003); cf. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg.
43,255 (Aug. 4, 1999) (directing federal agencies to take “action limiting the policymaking
discretion of the [s]tates [through preemptive regulatory action] only where . . . the national activity is appropriate in light of the presence of a problem of national significance”).
4. See David A. Brennen, Charities and the Constitution: Evaluating the Role of Constitutional Principles in Determining the Scope of Tax Law’s Public Policy Limitation for
Charities, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 779, 786-87 (2002).
5. See, e.g., Craig Holman, The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act: Limits and Opportunities for Non-Profit Groups in Federal Elections, 31 N. KY. L. REV. 243, 280-82 (2004);
Craig Holman & Joan Claybrook, Outside Groups in the New Campaign Finance Environment: The Meaning of BCRA and the McConnell Decision, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 235,
245-54 (2004); see also Fred Stokeld, Group Complains to IRS About Falwell’s FundRaising Letter, 28 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 464, 464 (2000).
6. Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’d, 126 S. Ct. 904
(2006).
7. See Bradford C. Mank, Are Title VI’s Disparate Impact Regulations Valid?, 71 U.
CIN. L. REV. 517, 518-19 (2002).
8. See, e.g., Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 661-63 (9th Cir. 1997) (analyzing the
“complex question” of how courts should review agency decisions that may also implicate
constitutional considerations).
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meaning is a choice of policy.9 That view has been the dominant
paradigm in the judicial review of agency statutory interpretation
since the Court’s 1984 opinion in Chevron, U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., where the Court determined that it
must defer to “reasonable” agency choices on the presumption that
agencies have superior technical expertise, better information, and a
more direct connection to popular policy preferences.10 In this view,
statutory texts have no single, fixed meaning; the best interpretation
changes over time according to new facts and new politics.11
Yet from the other direction there are the Court’s opinions in City
of Boerne v. Flores and similar decisions, which suggest that Congress cannot redefine a constitutional provision that has already
been interpreted by the Court.12 These cases seem to propose the opposite view of interpretation when it arises in the constitutional context: Political choices are suspect, and the Court’s chosen interpretation of the constitutional text is the “right meaing,” to be secondguessed, if at all, only by the Court.13 While congressional efforts to
remedy or prevent constitutional violations are legitimate, even
those may be struck down if under the guise of enforcement they attempt to change the Court’s chosen definition.14 Some commentators
have labeled this view as “judicial exclusivity,” because, in essence,
only the Court is permitted to interpret the Constitution.15
This Article discusses the threshold question of whether a reviewing court can permit any independent executive interpretation of the
Constitution—that is, irrespective of any deterrence, whether an
agency even has the authority to take a view of the Constitution dif9. See Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the
Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1394-98 (1996) (describing the realist movement).
10. 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984); see 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 2.6, at 100-01 (4th ed. 2002); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and
Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 62127 (1996). Some accounts put the rise of realism much earlier—for example, with the
Court’s decision in Erie Railroad. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), that each state is
entitled to develop its own common law free of federal control, or with the development of
administrative law during the middle of the last century. See Michael C. Dorf, Foreword:
The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 47-48 (1998); Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69 HARV. L. REV. 239, 263 (1955).
11. See Dorf, supra note 10, at 47; Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 309-17 (1989).
12. 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997); see Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356, 365 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 80-83 (2000); see also Henry P.
Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 32-33 (1983) (noting tension between constitutional and nonconstitutional review of administrative action).
13. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 525 (2000).
14. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519, 530.
15. Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 VA.
L. REV. 83, 86 (1998).
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ferent from the courts. Although doctrine is unresolved, it would
seem as though there is at least a strong inference that the principles
of Boerne must apply as much to agencies as to Congress—otherwise
Congress could evade Boerne simply by delegating to an agency the
power that the Court forbids Congress to exercise. Additionally,
courts traditionally will read the scope of delegated authority narrowly to avoid a serious question about the constitutionality of an executive decision.16 To the extent that the applicability of Boerne to
agencies is in doubt, courts may simply presume that Congress does
not intend to give agencies authority that might arguably approach
the limits of its own power.
Although formally Boerne and its progeny address only the scope
of Congress’s power to “enforce” the Fourteenth Amendment, the underlying rationale for judicial exclusivity may extend much farther.
The Boerne question overlaps significantly with a heated scholarly
dispute about the interpretive independence of each of the three
branches of government. The dominant view, called “departmentalism” in some quarters, holds that judicial interpretations of the Constitution are binding only within the scope of a particular case or
controversy before a court.17 For example, the departmentalist might
say that although the Supreme Court has defined what sorts of political activities by certain nonprofit entities cannot be regulated by
the government, the IRS might voluntarily take a broader reading of
the First Amendment in exempting a wider class from regulation.
The few academic opponents of departmentalism claim in contrast
that the Constitution means, in essence, only what a court says it
means.18 The Boerne rule might be framed as a logical corollary of
that view: the other branches can apply and enforce the Constitution

16. See Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172-73 (2001);
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 190-91 (1991).
17. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 106-08, 144 (2004); Devins & Fisher, supra note 15, at 88, 91, 96; Dawn
E. Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation: Who Determines
Constitutional Meaning?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2004, at 105-06; Gary Lawson
& Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L.
REV. 1267, 1269-70 (1996); Frank I. Michelman, Living with Judicial Supremacy, 38 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 579, 597-602 (2003); Bruce G. Peabody, Nonjudicial Constitutional Interpretation, Authoritative Settlement, and a New Agenda for Research, 16 CONST. COMMENT.
63, 63-65 & n.2 (1999). Michael Stokes Paulsen goes one step farther, arguing that the executive is sometimes not bound even by court judgments against it. Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO.
L.J. 217, 264 (1994).
18. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 455, 455 (2000) [hereinafter Alexander & Schauer, Defending
Supremacy]; Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1387 (1997) [hereinafter Alexander & Schauer, Extrajudicial Interpretation]; Burt Neuborne, The Binding Quality of Supreme Court Precedent,
61 TUL. L. REV. 991, 993, 998-99 (1987).
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as the judiciary has interpreted it, but they have no authority to act
based on any constitutional interpretation other than that of the judiciary.
The academic literature, though, has not yet considered the significance of departmentalism as a rule of administrative law. That is,
while commentators have explored whether departmentalism is an
attractive theory for Congress and the President, they have not addressed whether it meets the institutional needs of the Court. For instance, one common argument against judicial exclusivity is that
sometimes courts will act immorally, so there must be an option of
public disobedience.19 But we can hardly expect courts to design doctrine based upon that claim. And much of the existing analysis focuses on vetoes, pardons, and prosecutorial discretion—areas where
judicial review is impossible, so judicial response is largely irrelevant.
Another significant gap in the existing literature is its apparent
assumption that judicial exclusivity is an either-or proposition. On
one side, judges must have exclusive power to interpret the Constitution, because the judiciary is in the best position to save us from
wasteful and irreconcilable arguments about conflicting interpretations.20 On the other side, judges have no realm exclusive to themselves, because constitutional law is policy, and because the benefits
of experiment, superior information, and more complete accountability apply to constitutional and statutory law alike.21 While the rule of
Boerne may have many vices, it is more nuanced than the prevailing
bipolar treatment suggests. The Court says that it prohibits “substantive change” of the Constitution but permits its “enforcement.”22
As others have pointed out, this structure permits a fair amount of
what is probably in reality constitutional interpretation by Congress.23 Yet there has been no thorough consideration whether this
hybrid regime, which I call “partial exclusivity,” can peacefully coexist with either competing camp.24
19. See infra text accompanying notes 105-06.
20. See Alexander & Schauer, Extrajudicial Interpretation, supra note 18, at 1360-62,
1371-81.
21. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and
Judicial Supremacy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1027, 1034-37 (2004). As I will explain, we should be
careful not to confuse this position with lawlessness or executive supremacy. Those who
are opposed to judicial exclusivity are not necessarily opposed to judicial review, in which
the Supreme Court may be “supreme” in the sense that its views about what the law
means in a given case are binding on the other branches of government and other litigants.
See infra text accompanying notes 43-51.
22. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518-20 (1997).
23. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 857, 885 (1999).
24. Recently, Professor Alexander, writing with Lawrence Solum, appeared to argue
that exclusivity might apply to some constitutional “rules” but not to some constitutional

162

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:157

This Article tries to fill those theoretical lacunae. Using Boerne as
a starting point, I ask what rule of administrative law courts would
likely adopt if they were motivated by the concerns that produced the
Boerne opinion. How should courts respond when an agency claims
that its policy choice is justified by the agency’s understanding of the
Constitution, where that understanding departs from what courts
have said the Constitution means? Should courts read all delegations
narrowly to exclude executive constitutional interpretations? If not,
might there be at least some situations where courts should appropriately reject executive interpretations, even if they might be inclined to agree if they reached the merits? Or should there be no limits at all on these “independent” executive interpretations?
Although it is focused on the underpinnings of Boerne, this Article
is only modestly descriptive. I confess here at the outset that my aim
is to fit a theory of collaborative interpretation into the prevailing
doctrine, which is nominally exclusivist. Thus, I engage Boerne and
its possible justifications critically as a springboard for examining
the institutional considerations that might, from the judiciary’s perspective, justify either complete or partial judicial exclusivity vis-àvis the executive.
I conclude that although a blanket presumption against independent executive interpretation is hard to defend, there is a fairly
strong argument for partial exclusivity—a rule that would prohibit
agencies from utilizing their own constitutional interpretations in
some circumstances, but not in others. I readily concede the arguments of proponents of collaborative interpretation. Indeed, I am one
of them. The utility of partial exclusivity is that it carves out some
small portion of constitutional law beyond the reach of politics, but
allows for collaboration and experimentation with the remainder,
which may in turn benefit the judiciary’s solitary elaboration of the
apolitical core. I also agree that the formalist distinction between
statutory and constitutional law is incoherent, and that any efforts to
disarm popular resistance to countermajoritarian decisions based
upon claims that the Court is uniquely “right” in the field of constitutional law are ultimately bound to fail. Further, as I explain, I am
skeptical of the assertions made by Boerne’s academic defenders that
exclusivity settles the law in a way that could not be replicated by
ordinary judicial review using doctrines that encourage a high degree
of administrative rigidity. I also doubt that settlement is so important that it should prevail over the values of collaboration.

“standards.” Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118
HARV. L. REV. 1594, 1632-34 (2005) (reviewing KRAMER, supra note 17). Alexander and
Solum do not explore whether their revised exclusivity can coexist with the rationale of
Alexander and Schauer’s seemingly more comprehensive views. I attempt that here.
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Nevertheless, I argue for partial exclusivity, rather than complete
freedom of executive interpretation, because some of the possible explanations for Boerne are surprisingly durable when employed sparingly. For example, by helping to reinforce the judicial self-image, exclusivity may at times promote principled behavior both by judges
and those they review. If nothing else, exclusivity gives courts an
empty platform from which to stage a pageant of moral leadership on
divisive issues.
In the ensuing parts, I develop these themes and the debates that
surround them in greater detail. Part II explains the existing state of
the law on how courts should respond to executive claims of authority to interpret the Constitution, and situates that law in a larger debate about whether judges should be the exclusive interpreters of the
Constitution. Part III moves on to the only really comprehensive defense of judicial exclusivity, which is the claim that judges alone are
capable of settling the law so that it is more predictable and less
wasteful. After assessing the arguments in favor of settlement as a
premiere value, and finding them rather unconvincing, Part IV nevertheless assumes that even if settlement is our highest value and
judges the best defenders of it, we would probably be content with
judicial review instead of exclusivity. Part IV examines an alternative claim based upon the unique competence of judges—that keeping
constitutional interpretation solely within the judiciary will further
protection for rights conceived as “public goods” or “second-order
preferences” (that is, as things we should all want but selfishly fail to
preserve). Part IV finds, however, that exclusivity overextends judges
and needlessly gives up better means for identifying and preserving
these kinds of preferences. Part V posits that exclusivity might be an
indispensable tool of judicial rhetoric. Part V first rejects the idea
that exclusivity can be a useful component of Bickelian claims that
judicial opinions reach “right” answers and so have unique moral
claims on the public. It goes on to propose that rhetoric is part of the
judiciary’s efforts to define itself in contrast to the “unprincipled”
world of politics, and thereby reinforces the judicial self-image as a
principled defender of rights. The Part concludes by observing that,
under this rationale, universal exclusivity would appear to be unnecessary. Part VI takes up that possibility, exploring whether only partial exclusivity is intellectually coherent, how it would affect other
possible judicial goals, and how it relates to the Boerne rule. Part VII
returns more directly to the doctrinal question that we began with,
arguing that agencies might actually be less constrained in their constitutional interpretations than Congress. In Part VIII, I synthesize
the various arguments for and against exclusivity to formulate a
plausible test for when exclusivity ought to be invoked against execu-
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tive interpretations. I then give a pair of examples demonstrating
how the test might work in practice. Part IX concludes.
II. SOME BACKGROUND ON THE BACKGROUND RULES
This Part sketches the prevailing wisdom about an agency’s authority to make decisions based upon constitutional reasoning. Because doctrine says little directly about the subject, my sketch swiftly
expands into a more general picture of how a court ought to respond
to executive claims to independent constitutional interpretative authority. In the last decade, the Supreme Court has asserted that it
alone is the nation’s authoritative interpreter of the Constitution,
which obviously implies a chilly reception for agencies who think
otherwise. But, as surveyed very briefly here, there are scarcely any
commentators who find merit in the Court’s position. Two of those
who have dared most prominently to defend it have also been received frostily.
I begin with the scant doctrine. A handful of lower court decisions
have suggested that agencies lack power to consider the Constitution
independent of a court’s views.25 Yet others claim, perhaps contradictorily, that agencies can defy the clear mandate of statutory language
in order to avoid violating the Constitution.26 But the opinions in this
second camp are ambiguous about whether the power they describe
arises only to avoid constitutional questions a court has already identified, or if an agency can ignore Congress based on its own view of
the Constitution. As a result, they offer little guidance about the
power of an agency independently to interpret the Constitution.
Structural inferences from broader administrative law are not
much clearer. Federal courts usually defer to federal agencies on
questions of statutory interpretation.27 Contemporary interpretative
doctrine recognizes that the choice of a statute’s meaning within the
range of lexical possibilities created by the text is a policy decision, a

25. Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 662 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that courts should
not defer to agency constitutional interpretations because agencies usually have no authority to issue them and, in any event, are not expert at them); Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman,
842 F.2d 1102, 1122-26 (9th Cir. 1988), withdrawn, 893 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1989); Plato v.
Roudebush, 397 F. Supp. 1295, 1305-06 (D. Md. 1975); see also Johnson v. Robison, 415
U.S. 361, 368 (1974) (noting that agencies generally do not have jurisdiction to consider
constitutional challenges to statutes); Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. 524,
545-47, 612-13 (1838) (stating in dicta that the President does not have power to order his
officers to disobey Congress).
26. See Marozsan v. United States, 852 F.2d 1469, 1492 & n.4 (7th Cir. 1988) (en
banc) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting); cf. Cont’l Air Lines, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 843 F.2d
1444, 1455-56 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that an agency has authority to construe a statute
in light of constitutional concerns, even though it cannot pass on the constitutionality of
the statute itself).
27. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227-28 (2001).
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choice of the “best” reading of the statute.28 Because an agency’s capacity for gathering information about a problem, for accumulating
technical expertise, and for sensitivity to public norms about the
most desirable resolution are all (mostly) superior to the comparable
capacity of federal courts, the Court allows the agency to choose the
“best” meaning, absent some strong indication that the agency has
acted contrary to congressional intent.29 That is the core of the Chevron doctrine—the rule that a court must defer to the reasonable
views of an agency authorized by Congress to interpret an ambiguity
in a particular statute.30 Of course, Chevron depends on the assumption that an agency has actually exercised its capabilities. Thus,
courts can also review the process of agency decisionmaking to ensure that it is relatively transparent, democratic, and deliberative,
or, in the doctrinal formula, not “arbitrary and capricious.”31
These two principles, which form the bedrock of modern administrative law, seem to translate poorly to the realm of constitutional interpretation. The Supreme Court, especially over the last decade, has
resisted the claim that interpretations of constitutional text, like
readings of statutory text, are political decisions. Most prominently,
in City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court reacted almost with disdain to
the possibility that constitutional decisions could be reduced to the
status of “ordinary” politics.32 Thus, it held that Congress’s power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to “enforce” the Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress authority only to enact norms derived directly from the Court’s own understanding of the Constitution’s meaning.33 Congress could try to remedy or prevent constitutional injuries, but only after it demonstrated that the injuries its
legislation targeted were harms that the Court itself would consider
breaches of the Constitution.34 In effect, Boerne announced a rule of
“judicial exclusivity”; only courts can decide what the Constitution
means, no matter how popular, deliberative, or informed Congress’s
choices might be.35
The question for this Article is to what extent the rationale of
Boerne extends to agency interpretations of the Constitution. Can an

28. See Rubin, supra note 9, at 1394-98, 1401.
29. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002); 1 PIERCE, supra note 10, § 2.6, at
97-98.
30. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984); see Mead, 535 U.S. at 229-31.
31. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43-44
(1983); 1 PIERCE, supra note 10, § 7.1, at 413.
32. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997).
33. Id. at 519-20.
34. Id. at 519, 532; see also United States v. Georgia, 126 S. Ct. 877, 880-82 (2006);
Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001).
35. Devins & Fisher, supra note 15, at 93.
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agency, citing its own independent view of the First Amendment, in
effect reenact the Religious Freedom Restoration Act struck down by
the Court in Boerne by obliging states doing business with it to avoid
undue burdens on religious exercise? Can it curtail its own enforcement of a statute it superintends by explaining that, although the
Court’s precedents allow such enforcement, the agency believes it
would be unconstitutional?
Strictly doctrinal reasoning might suggest not. If the Court’s intent is to curtail Congress, it hardly seems likely to let an agency
reach the same result after Congress delegates, with a wink and
nudge, power to do it. The “arbitrary and capricious” standard could
be a formal tool for articulating that line of reasoning. Conventionally, an agency acts arbitrarily when it bases its decision on a factor
Congress did not want it to consider.36 We might similarly say that a
factor that Congress could not have itself considered cannot be
passed along to the agency for the agency’s use.
Of course, nominally Boerne’s doctrinal reach is very narrow: it
constrains only Congress’s efforts to use Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. But its rhetorical claims seem very large. Suppose, for
example, that a court was in the rare position of deciding whether
Congress’s reason for enacting a statute is a legitimate purpose—for
instance, when deciding whether a statute can withstand First
Amendment scrutiny. Can a statute survive constitutional balancing
when Congress asserts that the justification for the statute is to protect another constitutional right, and that other right as defined by
Congress differs from the Court’s prior interpretations? If we take
the rhetoric of Boerne at face value, then perhaps not; only the Court
can define rights, and therefore Congress can have little interest in
preserving a “right” that in the Court’s view does not exist.
Turning back to agencies, it is apparent that we need to understand more about Boerne before we can answer our questions. Courts
review the reasons agencies give for their decisions in almost every
case—either directly, or indirectly, in the form of an assumption that
the agency’s decision is entitled to deference. Does Boerne stand for
the proposition that the political branches can never rest their decisions on constitutional deliberation, unless that deliberation takes
the Constitution to mean strictly what the Court has said?
It is important to recognize that as long as this question is open, it
not only raises doubts about the legitimacy of many agency decisions,
but also in many cases actually forecloses them. That is because
courts also presume that Congress, absent clear statutory authorization, does not intend to delegate to an agency power that would skirt

36. See 1 PIERCE, supra note 10, § 7.4, at 452.
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the edges of the authority the Constitution permits.37 This is an aspect of “constitutional avoidance”—the principle that courts should
deflect unresolved constitutional questions rather than answer
them.38 The effect is usually to give stronger protection to the underlying constitutional right without exhausting as much of the Court’s
political capital as might be expended in an outright constitutional
holding.39 For example, as Professor Bickel once observed, in presuming that agencies cannot exercise any power that might approach a
constitutional limit, a court forces the agency to return to Congress
for unmistakable statutory authorization—a process that is both
time-consuming and difficult and that also arguably makes Congress’s decision to challenge the Court more visible to the public.40
Thus courts might, in the name of avoiding a Boerne-type question,
prevent agencies from using any independent constitutional judgment (unless Congress clearly requires it).
The avoidance rationale suggests that this reasoning might well
be backward. If avoidance is supposed to afford greater protection of
rights, then it might be perverse to make it harder for an agency to
give a more expansive interpretation of a constitutional right than
the Court, burdened by doubts about its policymaking competency
and democratic pedigree, is willing to declare. This is the essence of
the argument offered by critics of the Boerne rule. Courts, these critics say, should cooperate with the political branches, nurturing rights
interpretation where it sprouts outside the courthouse walls and
drawing on the expertise and popular insight of the other two
branches in making the judiciary’s own interpretations better.41
Other commentators broaden this approach beyond the government
entirely, arguing that since “the people themselves” are the ultimate
arbiters of constitutional meaning, we should trust that an informed

37. See Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172-73 (2001);
1 PIERCE, supra note 10, § 2.6, at 93. Despite this presumption, the Court sometimes is
forced to confront the constitutionality of a delegation, as where it is clear that Congress
intended to authorize an agency to approach the constitutional limits of its authority. See,
e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1986).
38. Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 82-83; Adrian
Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1949 (1997).
39. See Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 27-28 (1957); Richard A. Posner,
Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800,
816 (1983).
40. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 156-69 (2d ed. 1986); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Is the
Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 MICH. L. REV. 303, 358-59 (1999).
41. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT 24-27 (1999); Dorf, supra note 10, at 69-73; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 150-51 (1997); Post & Siegel,
supra note 13, at 516-19.
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populace can offer the check on unjust political interpretations of the
Constitution that courts now claim to provide.42
The applicability of Boerne to agency decisions also intersects another, related, academic debate about the Supreme Court’s “supremacy.” Scholars have wrestled with the extent to which the Court’s interpretations of the Constitution should bind other branches of government. Although terminology is often muddled, there is widespread agreement about most points. There are three basic flavors of
supremacy. The first two form the core of what we traditionally think
of as the power of judicial review. In the first, which we might call
Merryman supremacy, the other branches are bound to follow the
holding of a case in which they participate as a party.43 With the exception of Professor Paulsen, and possibly Dean Kramer, no one has
seriously argued that a coordinate branch can disregard a judgment
entered against it.44 The second flavor we might call Klein supremacy; it would hold that Congress and the Executive cannot order
courts to give up a judicial interpretation of the Constitution in favor
of the view of one of the coordinate branches.45 The critical feature of
Klein supremacy is that its focus is on what courts do. While political actors cannot direct a constitutional rule of decision for a court,
Klein supremacy says nothing directly about what the Constitution
means for nonjudicial actors not subject to judicial review. This, too,
is generally uncontroversial; it is the variety of supremacy at stake in
Professor Monaghan’s seminal work on “constitutional common
law.”46 As Monaghan describes it, a court can draw lines separating
constitutional holdings, which cannot be “overturned” legislatively,
from constitutional common law, a regime under which the court’s
view can be superseded by statute or regulation.47

42. KRAMER, supra note 17, at 247-48; Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against
Judicial Review, 3 (Mar. 16, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.ucl.ac.uk/spp/
download/seminars/0405/Waldron-Judicial.pdf; see MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 30-32, 177-94 (1999); see also Alexander & Solum,
supra note 24, at 1623-24 (explicating, but disagreeing with, KRAMER, supra note 17).
43. Johnsen, supra note 17, at 108; see Alexander & Solum, supra note 24, at 1608.
Professor Paulsen describes what he hypothesizes as the President’s power to defy judgments as “Merryman Power,” after the clash between Lincoln and the Supreme Court over
Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus at the outset of the Civil War. See Paulsen, supra note 17, at 277-84.
44. See KRAMER, supra note 17, at 201; Alexander & Solum, supra note 24, at 1614;
Paulsen, supra note 17, at 277; see also Post & Siegel, supra note 21, at 1033-34 (interpreting Kramer’s claims).
45. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 146 (1871); see Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm,
Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1995); see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-04
(1974) (rejecting the President’s claim that his interpretation of executive privilege should
bind the Court).
46. Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1,
3 (1975).
47. Id. at 23-30.

2005]

JUSTICE OF ADMINISTRATION

169

The third flavor, and the marginally more controversial one, asks
whether nonjudicial actors must treat the Constitution as though it
means only what courts have understood it to mean, even if the constitutional question arises in a context very unlikely ever to reach a
court. The dominant contemporary view, generally called “departmentalism,” holds that they do not.48 For example, departmentalists
claim that when the President pardons an individual on the theory
that the statute criminalizing her conduct is unconstitutional, the
President may apply his own independent understanding of the Constitution and not simply what a court has said (or, perhaps, would
say).49 In a sense, Boerne is the inverse of departmentalism, in that
Boerne seems to depend on an assumption that, at least for nonjudicial constitutional decisions that later come before the Court for review, valid “constitutional” interpretation can mean only interpretation that echoes what the Court itself has already said.50 Again, academic defections from the departmentalism camp are scarce. Most
prominently, one lonely pair, Larry Alexander and Fred Schauer, argue that this third variety of supremacy—they call it “exclusivity”—
is normatively attractive because it produces many of the goods
Monaghan claimed for Klein supremacy: stability, certainty, and
“settlement”—the opportunity for the Court to take “off the table”
disputes that society will only waste time and effort trying to solve
for itself.51 Their view, though, is not widely shared.
This Article is about how courts should respond to the claims of
departmentalism. Are those claims persuasive? Even if they are, can
a court accept them and still go about its business? Or are the three
supremacies in some respects interwoven, so that a court must claim
supremacy in all three fields in order for any one of them, even the
anti-Merryman power, ultimately to be effective? And is this last concern so serious that courts should presume broadly that Congress
does not intend to delegate departmentalist-type power, or is it a
concern that can be addressed more effectively case by case?
Before moving on, it will be helpful to clarify two last points. The
third variety of supremacy may prohibit independent constitutional
interpretation, but it would seem not to affect agency efforts to predict what courts will say. That is, an agency might curtail enforce48. See supra note 17 and accompanying text; see also Alexander & Solum, supra note
24, at 1612-13 (outlining the departmentalist view); Alexander & Schauer, Extrajudicial
Interpretation, supra note 18, at 1359 (describing view they criticize as “a consensus . . .
among scholars and officials”).
49. See Alexander & Solum, supra note 24, at 1629-30; Paulsen, supra note 17, at 26467.
50. See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One:
The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 352-53 (1998) (describing “judicial
supremacy”); Johnsen, supra note 17, at 119.
51. See Alexander & Schauer, Extrajudicial Interpretation, supra note 18, at 1371-81.
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ment activities for constitutional reasons in two distinct ways. The
first is because it wants to avoid invalidation by a court on constitutional grounds. The other is because it concludes, based on its own
reading of the Constitution, that its actions are unconstitutional and
therefore are to be avoided. This is an important difference because
the predictive model acknowledges judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation, while the second ignores or defies it. Thus,
Boerne-type exclusivity should accept without much difficulty extrajudicial constitutional interpretation that is only an extrapolation of
what courts have done, engaged in for the purpose of avoiding judicial invalidation. My focus in the rest of this Article accordingly sets
aside that situation, which I view as an easy case, and concentrates
instead on the issue of the permissibility of truly independent constitutional reasoning by the Executive.
It is also worth emphasizing that I see a difference between review for whether an interpretation is permissible and review for
whether that interpretation is correct. Boerne, for example, seems to
consist of two separate inquiries: first, whether the constitutional
right recognized by Congress protects the same conduct safeguarded
by judicial opinion—whether Congress is “right” about the law—and
then to the extent that it deviates, whether it goes too far, or instead
is sufficiently “congruent and proportional” with the underlying
right.52 If we entirely rejected departmentalism, we would terminate
the Boerne inquiry at the end of the first prong, once we had concluded that Congress’s action could only be justified by an independent constitutional judgment. On the other hand, a very strong departmentalist rule might avoid the need for the first step altogether;
it would be enough that Congress’s judgment rested on its own view
of the Constitution, and the Court would have no authority to secondguess that determination. Thus, the question whether independent
interpretation is permissible may avoid entirely the need to judge
whether an interpretation is “right” in the court’s view.53 As Boerne
shows, we then face an additional puzzle about how, or whether, to
impose other limits on permissible nonjudicial interpretations. But
that is an inquiry I leave for later work. What follows considers only
whether agency interpretations of the Constitution may be valid irrespective of whether a court would say that they are “correct.”
52. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 519-21 (2004).
53. For this reason, I disagree with the claim by Professors Alexander and Solum that
departmentalism is ultimately pointless. They argue that in the end, all nonjudicial interpretations can be brought before a court for examination on the merits, so that permitting
initial independent interpretation accomplishes little. Alexander & Solum, supra note 24,
at 1614-15. But that seems to presume their case; if courts are willing to tolerate “constitutional” norms established by other political actors without demanding judicial review of the
accuracy of the norm, then judicial control over the shape of the norm is not at all inevitable.
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III. COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE, OR BOERNE EST
MORT
As I suggested in the last Part, scholarly debate over extrajudicial
constitutional interpretation now centers on the question of whether
the judiciary is in some way uniquely capable of authoritative interpretation. That is, if the main argument against departmentalism is
“settlement,” the burden falls on critics of departmentalism to show
that judges can provide settlement that politics cannot. And, naturally, the critics also have to show that settlement matters. Indeed,
the principle objection to Professors Alexander and Schauer is not
that they are wrong in that courts are more adept at “settling” the
law, but rather that it is often better to be accurate than to be final.54
In the realm of purely statutory interpretation, it is generally agreed
that the political branches are more likely to be “right” as a matter of
policy.55 Schauer ripostes, however, that there are some issues we
know we cannot trust the political branches to answer “correctly.”56
In this Part, I try, with all due respect to the current combating
scholars, to refine the terms of their debate. Part III.A considers the
running debate over whether the law’s settlement function is a logical choice as the highest value for our legal system to pursue, and if
so, whether judges are best positioned to defend it. I conclude that although it is probably correct that judges are likely to be better able to
settle the law, the case for settlement as an overarching concern is
tenuous, especially considering that we do not make the same claim
for the interpretation of statutes. Part III.B, however, accepts both
premises, but argues that we might still not agree that these premises entail judicial exclusivity rather than the more limited supremacy entailed by judicial review.
A. Well, That Settles It. Right?
For Alexander and Schauer—at least when they are writing together—“settlement” is a premiere value.57 For them, the rule of law
is all: Consistent and predictable constitutional rules make planning
easier, and prevent wasteful efforts to alter its existing form or to

54. See Devins & Fisher, supra note 15, at 103-04.
55. See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 15051 (1991); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (citing Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST
4-5 (1980); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 630-31 (1992); Manning, supra note 10, at 627.
56. Frederick Schauer, Judicial Supremacy and the Modest Constitution, 92 CAL. L.
REV. 1045, 1055, 1064-66 (2004).
57. Alexander & Schauer, Defending Supremacy, supra note 18, at 473.

172

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:157

predict how a rule will develop.58 They argue against departmentalism by discussing Professor Monaghan’s familiar point that society
benefits from avoiding debate about contentious issues.59 And they
suggest that these values outweigh any benefits that might inure to
society from rules that were more adaptable and more open to outside input.60
This Part considers the arguments against settlement, starting
with common points by critics and moving on to some thoughts of my
own. On the whole I think settlement fares somewhat better than the
current consensus suggests, although I do not think either side has a
real knock down argument.
1. Empirical Challenges
The first problem with the settlement justification for judicial exclusivity is basically a problem of fit. Although Alexander and
Schauer rather weakly argue that their claim is really about what an
ideal system should be,61 they do little to explain why, if their proposal is consistent with our prevailing notion of how justice should
function, our current system does not incorporate much of their position.62 In fact, I think their defense on this ground could be more spirited. For example, to critics who point out that seemingly definitive
Supreme Court rulings on issues like abortion and affirmative action
hardly seem to have eased societal disagreement,63 they might respond that this disagreement only illustrates their point. Much of the
ongoing debate seems to involve efforts to affect future Supreme
Court decisions, by selecting Justices with different points of view.64
58. Id. at 482; Alexander & Schauer, Extrajudicial Interpretation, supra note 18, at
1371-81.
59. Alexander & Schauer, Defending Supremacy, supra note 18, at 467, 469-70; Alexander & Schauer, Extrajudicial Interpretation, supra note 18, at 1380; see Henry Paul
Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 750-51
(1988).
60. Alexander & Schauer, Defending Supremacy, supra note 18, at 470, 475; Alexander & Schauer, Extrajudicial Interpretation, supra note 18, at 1372-73.
61. Alexander & Schauer, Defending Supremacy, supra note 18, at 460-64.
62. See Paulsen, supra note 17, at 225; cf. Scott E. Gant, Judicial Supremacy and
Nonjudicial Interpretation of the Constitution, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 359, 373 (1997)
(“[O]ur current legal regime at times operates other than we would expect if judicial supremacy were an accurate descriptive account.”). Alexander and Schauer acknowledge this
difficulty but addresses it only indirectly by arguing that their focus on institutional competence adequately accounts for real-world considerations. See Alexander & Schauer, Defending Supremacy, supra note 18, at 465, 480. They do not, however, get around to explaining their “fit” problem.
63. See Devins & Fisher, supra note 15, at 84-85; Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial
Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 801
(2002).
64. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (1994); KRAMER, supra note 17, at 227-28; cf. Monaghan, supra
note 59, at 750 (explaining that settlement may remove merits of a constitutional judg-
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In other words, maybe Supreme Court decisions are not really settling issues the way Alexander and Schauer suggest because the decisions now are not seen as being truly final.
Perhaps an even stronger sense of Supreme Court exclusivity and
finality would cut off this debate as well. Suppose it was widely
thought that, inasmuch as constitutional deliberation is the Court’s
task alone, the views of future Justices on constitutional matters are
not proper factors for the President or the Senate to consider in selecting Justices. At the very least, if it were clear that Presidents and
Senators largely felt this way, whatever the public’s view, it might
significantly dampen the debate about how to unsettle what the Supreme Court has already settled.65 And of course, a very powerful
rule of stare decisis, adhered to scrupulously by the Justices, might
have a similar effect.66
Another possible response, this one closer to the surface of Alexander and Schauer’s argument, is that although our system values
stability, political market failures conceal that preference. Specifically, Alexander and Schauer claim that ordinary politics fails to
match the level of stability the judiciary can ideally achieve.67 But
there is a minor puzzle here they do not resolve. If stability is valuable to all of society, why is it not already produced at the optimal
level by the political market?

ment from dispute without necessarily resolving the dispute about the judges who made
it); Post & Siegel, supra note 21, at 1042 (“Through the appointment and confirmation
process . . . the people in the end will have the form of constitutional law that they deem
fit.”).
65. But cf. Post & Siegel, supra note 21, at 1030 (“No plausible version of judicial supremacy would prevent citizens from voting for a President because they believe he will
appoint Supreme Court Justices who will express the citizens’ own view of the Constitution
. . . .”). It is, of course, hard to think of a judicial rule that could achieve such an effect. One
possible step in that direction would be a conflict of interest rule that required Justices to
recuse themselves in any constitutional case on which they have expressed a view that
could have been known by the President or the Senate. As for Professors Post and Siegel’s
complaint, it is unclear from their work why a system that tries in this way to discourage
private contemplation of the Constitution is less “plausible” than other forms of settlement.
Indeed, the object of settlement generally seems to be to relieve the public and politics of
the burdens (along, of course, with the autonomy) that such contemplation entails. Their
argument thus seems addressed more to the claims of settlement generally than to any
particular instrumental route to closing off the political manipulation of judicial outcomes.
I address what I take to be their psychological point about the overall plausibility of settlement later, in Part V.B.
66. But see Whittington, supra note 63, at 801-04.
67. See Alexander & Schauer, Defending Supremacy, supra note 18, at 476-77; see
also Peabody, supra note 17, at 73-74 (challenging Alexander and Schauer’s hypothesis
that the other branches cannot make authoritative decisions that promote stability).
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Public choice analysis suggests a possible answer.68 In a nutshell,
public choice predicts that a regulation with obvious substantial impact on a relatively small, well-defined group is likely to face a stiff
challenge if its benefits would flow subtly and thinly to a diverse majority.69 The caveat, however, is that this outcome is only a general
tendency, and it may change if the regulators, for whatever reason,
are less subject to the intensity, rather than sheer numerosity, of
constituent preferences.70
However, even with that caution flag raised, public choice still has
a lot to offer Alexander and Schauer. Stability seems like a fine example of a public good we would expect to be frequently subdued by
more concrete interests. For the most part, the benefits of predictability and repose flow broadly to everyone in society, but their exact
measures are hard to quantify. In contrast, the incentives to cheat
and to allow debate and deviation are powerful, and stability’s power
to restrain them is weak. Stability, in short, is the classic “common”
so prone to tragedy: with each poaching from the shared grazing
land, the poacher benefits much more than the shared land is hurt.
In turn there are a lot of poachers. Eventually, there will be no land
to graze. The political process will struggle to resist that process because each set of poachers will offer a benefit more tangible than stability to a group far more cohesive than society as a whole.71

68. In brief, public choice theory predicts that the decisions of government officials reflect not only the interests of the officials’ constituents, but also the intensity with which
those constituents express their interest. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic
Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
ANTHOLOGY, supra note 1, at 399, 402. Since voters often have limited information about
public policy and limited time in which to gather information and act on it, the average rational voter relies on others to monitor and lobby government officials on her behalf. Id.
There is obviously a diminishing need to rely on others to garner information as the impact
of any given policy becomes more obvious to that hypothetical voter—as the group of other
people the voter could rely on to fight on her behalf diminishes, she calculates that she will
have to fight more fiercely for herself, so that she is less inclined to “free-ride” on others’
lobbying efforts. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 21, 35 (1971); Stigler, supra, at 402. If her interest group is
fairly small and it is easy for members to recognize what they hold in common with each
other, they will have an easier time coming together as an effective lobbying force. Stigler,
supra, at 402.
69. Stigler, supra note 68, at 402.
70. See David B. Spence, A Public Choice Progressivism, Continued, 87 CORNELL L.
REV. 397, 398 (2002).
71. Further, in part because the gain from stability is so unquantifiable, it is very
easy for the cheater to paralyze the majority by arguing that most of that value will remain even if we cheat a little here or there. We are still mostly predictable, the cheater argues, even if we make this one exception, and if we promise there will be no more exceptions, then we keep all of the value of stability in the future and get the benefit of a better
rule! Ultimately, of course, the system recognizes the potency that such an argument will
have in the future and stops expecting the rule to defy would-be cheaters. Thus, stability
collapses. Nonetheless, it is difficult, I submit, to organize a political coalition based on
such an abstract claim.
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It might be argued that the cheaters also value stability—at least
once they have won. It is in the interest of any coalition to lock in its
gains—in effect, to make true its claim that its exception will be the
only one.72 Thus many theorists who study deals, both in legislation
and in contract, have suggested that powerful deal-making coalitions, even those who at one time were on opposite sides, might fight
against future cheaters to freeze the terms of their own deals.73 If so,
then we might actually expect a relatively high level of stability to
arise purely out of politics. As I have argued elsewhere, however, I
think the theorists I just mentioned have it wrong.74 Even in a very
stable legal system, the world itself changes. The fixed-price requirements contract that looks appealing to the supplier when prices
are low looks like an albatross when the market jumps. A powerful
central government that is appealing to a mercantile society in a hostile globe full of enemies may be intrusive and too expensive to an
agrarian nation in a time of peace. Wise deal-makers recognize not
only that future flexibility may be needed, but also that their own
capacity to design rules to allow the best choices in the future may be
limited at the time of the deal.75 Thus, whatever the force of the claim
that stability is better for society as a whole, actors who are motivated primarily by preserving their one deal are likely at best to be
ambivalent about a very rigid system of legal rules.
One other objection to this public-choice-oriented critique of politics as a preserver of stability might be that, as I mentioned at the
outset, it is not inevitable that public servants will respond to the expressed intensity of their constituents’ preferences. Of course, absent
the collective action problems that public choice addresses, it is
probably preferable that our government pay attention to how much
the populace cares about an issue. Intensity of preference may well
be a reasonable stand-in for overall utility, in that weighing the opposing sums of intensity might be a guide for the government in selecting net positive utility outcomes. If possible, then, it might be
preferable to design an institution that could filter out the intensity
of actual or hypothetical public preferences from the distortions that
sometimes arise when communicating them. Failing that, if we could
agree on a preeminent public good, we might try to design an institu72. See Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of
Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 261-64 (1987).
73. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 540-44
(1983); Robert E. Scott, The Rise and Fall of Article 2, 62 LA. L. REV. 1009, 1021 & n.35
(2002).
74. See Brian Galle, Getting Spending: How to Replace Clear Statement Rules with
Clear Thinking About Conditional Grants of Federal Funds, 37 CONN. L. REV. 155, 166-67,
171-74 (2004).
75. See, e.g., Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 716 (1986).
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tion that would select that good even in defiance of a strongly expressed public preference for the contrary. In his individual writing,
Schauer has advanced this second strategy as another justification
for assigning judges as guardians of rights.76 Now that we understand that stability itself can be seen as the same sort of public good
as more traditional rights, it is apparent that Schauer’s two arguments are closely interrelated. At the same time, they are vulnerable
to a single common criticism: that some political (that is, not judicial)
institution could conceivably perform the same function, if only there
were a realistic way of ensuring that the institution would value the
chosen public good over constituents’ preferences—or value it at least
as much as a court would.
The case for exclusive judicial defense of stability, therefore, must
answer the claims of social psychology and its potential implications
for the use of institutional ideology to constrain decisionmakers, political or otherwise. Criticism of what was for a time the predominant
public choice view of regulation now contends that it is psychologically unrealistic to presume that government decisionmakers will
necessarily pursue their own rational self-interest, which in turn
generally means adherence to the intensity of their constituents’
preferences.77 Powerful social forces make us want to live up to our
expected public role: we may feel that we give our lives meaning by
acting out the narrative that defines our culture and the places for us
in it. Or we may simply desire approbation and the higher social acceptance and status that may come with fulfilling expectations.78
Equally powerful forces—shame and shunning, loss of identity and
status—may punish us when we fail to act as others expect.79 Over
time, we may come to internalize these role norms.80 Thus, an insti76. Schauer, supra note 56, at 1055-56.
77. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1288 (2001); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630,
633-38 (1999); Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted
Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907, 1910 n.5
(2002) (noting dramatic expansion of psychological analysis of public lawmaking).
78. See BERNARD GUERIN, SOCIAL FACILITATION 164 (1993); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 354-58 (1997); Richard H.
McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 35565 (1997).
79. See Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 585-86
(1998); Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 537, 539-40 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV.
1051, 1130 (2000).
80. JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 131 (1989);
GABRIELE TAYLOR, PRIDE, SHAME, AND GUILT: EMOTIONS OF SELF-ASSESSMENT 57-68
(1985); McAdams, supra note 78, at 366; Mark C. Suchman & Lauren B. Edelman, Legal
Rational Myths: The New Institutionalism and the Law and Society Tradition, 21 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 903, 915 (1996).
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tution that believes its mission—its “ideology”—is to prefer the public good over mere political preferences and is widely expected by the
public to meet that task may well succeed.81
In consideration of this view it might be said that it is only differences in institutional ideology that distinguish judges from legislators, but that those differences could conceivably be erased. Judges
who play an integral role in the administrative process may begin to
see themselves more as political players than as “judges.” Realistically, it is almost as much in a judge’s rational self-interest to pander
to strong preferences as it is for a congressman. Judges may desire
higher judicial offices with greater prestige and power for which another confirmation hearing will be required. Supreme Court Justices
may harbor political ambitions. Dean Kramer theorizes that a significant source of state influence over federal officials is that federal
officials feel ties to the local state political parties from whence they
sprung.82 The same is likely true of judges. And judges may rationally calculate, as many agency staff are said to do, that they would be
rewarded upon retirement by a grateful favored interest group.83
That these inducements seem on their faces so weak and implausible
is testimony to the powerful expectation that they will largely be
looked on with disdain by our judges. But surely the same is possible,
at least in theory, for political actors as well. There was a period
when thoughtful scholars of administrative law believed that agency
personnel could be expected to disregard lobbyists in favor of the
public good.84 The Senate, at least at one time, aspired to be a model
of independent deliberation removed from the everyday struggle of
politics.85 What if those norms were considerably more forceful and
more durable? Could Alexander and Schauer still argue that the
courts are uniquely qualified to preserve stability, or even rights
generally?
Proponents of judicial exclusivity now have to argue that these divergent results are not coincidental. Ultimately, institutional ideology looks to be an expectations game with the possibility of circles
81. See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543,
562, 570 (2000); Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 767
(2001); Suchman & Edelman, supra note 80, at 919; cf. Mark Tushnet, Non-Judicial Review, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 453, 455 (2003) (arguing that “ideological commitments and
bureaucratic missions” explain why nonjudicial actors might engage in rigorous constitutional review).
82. Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 279-85 (2000).
83. Cf. Kevin T. McGuire, Lobbyists, Revolving Doors and the U.S. Supreme Court, 16
J.L. & POL. 113, 113-14 (2000) (making this point with regard to the Justices’ law clerks).
84. See Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1039, 1049 (1997).
85. See JOHN A. ROHR, TO RUN A CONSTITUTION: THE LEGITIMACY OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 28-32 (1986).
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both vicious and virtuous. Small failures to live up to an institution’s
ideology might breed public cynicism, which in turn will lower the
psychological pressure on institution members to conform, leading to
poorer performance and yet lower expectations. In the opposite direction, very high public expectation might result in self-selection of
candidates who believe in the institutional ideology and think they
can comply. Clearly, institutional design will matter. We know and
expect that elected officials will respond to constituent demands.86 It
will take unusually virtuous behavior, or special internal institutional design, to reverse that expectation. Other institutions, designed and perhaps justified to the public expressly to separate their
decisionmakers from elective pressure, begin life with the gift (if defense of second-order public preferences is what we desire) of a concurrent expectation that they will be less attendant to short-term
voter demands. In this account, it may be that the Progressives’ democratization of the Senate, in conjunction with the rhetoric of direct
democracy that they used to mobilize the nation for constitutional
amendment,87 is precisely what undermined the Senate as a useful
defender of stability or rights. Courts, designed to be as distant from
public demands as we could make them, and which are defended often on just that ground,88 began with a distinct expectations edge.
I doubt that this account is entirely satisfying. Political ideology,
however vicious the circle of cynical expectations, is probably not irreversible. As discussed in much greater length below, I very much
doubt that the political virtue of courts is self-sustaining. But the defender of judicial exclusivity at least can claim that the fate of stability is more precarious when it rests in political rather than judicial
hands. And there is a good explanation for why we have not seen significant stability emerge from the political marketplace.
2. Normative Challenges
Settlement has at least a plausible excuse for failing to fit our political system. What about on the normative side? In my view, the
mainstream critique of Alexander and Schauer’s account of exclusivity, although in some senses extremely persuasive, ultimately brings
us to a stalemate.
Again, the prevailing criticism of the exclusivity argument is
aimed at the premise that settlement is a premium value that only

86. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public
Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 285-89 (1988).
87. See Todd J. Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests: A Public Choice Analysis of
the Seventeenth Amendment, 73 OR. L. REV. 1007, 1016-21 (1994).
88. See KRAMER, supra note 17, at 98-105 (setting out early history of judicial explanations for power of judicial review).
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courts can adequately preserve.89 For critics, settling law when the
development of the law is ill-informed and autocratic seems, at best,
foolish.90 In contrast, allowing the political branches to consider and
to develop constitutional doctrine allows courts to gather practical
insight into difficult policy and empirical questions that may underlie their constitutional decisions (especially as those facts change
over time).91 Some of those empirical questions might include popular
preference for a particular moral, ethical, or utility outcome.92
The settlement proponent, however, can answer that courts are
able to obtain largely the same information. To the extent that this
critique simply depends on an information shortage, on an absence of
practical examples, or on a foreshortened period of ferment before the
court must lock in a particular rule, we could simply expand the field
of judicial vision. Not all social dispute is wasteful; settlement only
aims to cut off debate once it reaches the point at which it becomes
wasteful.93 So the Supreme Court could use avoidance techniques to
allow controversies to simmer among lower courts and in the real
world until it feels confident it has a good answer, or until it feels
that the benefits of a better answer would be outweighed by further
divisions. Even at that point, the Court can look to foreign courts and
foreign governments to see how they have resolved similar issues.
Similarly, state interpretation of state constitutional law might offer
opportunities for comparative constitutional law in a population that
is even more likely than the international community to reflect overall domestic views.94 Exclusivist courts also do not have to be closed

89. See Gant, supra note 62, at 388; Johnsen, supra note 17, at 114. For the antidepartmentalist view, see Alexander & Schauer, Extrajudicial Interpretation, supra note
18, at 1367-68.
90. See Gant, supra note 62, at 373, 388; Post & Siegel, supra note 13, at 467, 514-15;
see also Dorf, supra note 10, at 67 (judging that risk of getting the law wrong over the longterm is more serious a risk than dangers of disuniformity).
91. See Devins & Fisher, supra note 15, at 98-99; Dorf, supra note 10, at 65; Gant, supra note 62, at 388; Monaghan, supra note 46, at 28-29; Whittington, supra note 63, at 791.
92. See Post & Siegel, supra note 21, at 1037; Post & Siegel, supra note 13, at 515.
Courts in this alternative view do not have to cede justice to the ballot booth. Popular preferences are only one input; a wise court can use that information to inform its conception
of what is just, what is right, or what are the hypothetical utility preferences of voters (and
nonvoters). In turn courts can inform politics, reminding public officials and the public of
what they ought to prefer, given a more perfect political system. See Devins & Fisher, supra note 15, at 104-05; Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV.
577, 653-71 (1993).
93. See Alexander & Schauer, Extrajudicial Interpretation, supra note 18, at 1386.
94. I say “might” because it is uncertain what role a truly “exclusive” Supreme Court
would leave for state constitutional interpretation. Obviously, an issue is not really settled
if it can still be debated, in only slightly altered form, in fifty different states. Exclusivity
thus might push the U.S. Supreme Court to go beyond Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032
(1983), taking a very expansive view of when a state court decision in fact rests on “federal” grounds. The Court might, for example, define federal “law” very broadly, declaring
that a decision rests on “federal” grounds whenever it involves the same fundamental
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off to new information. Although, as I have mentioned, there will be
pressure within an exclusive regime to develop a very strong rule of
stare decisis, the courts might still try to strike a balance between
convincing the public that an issue is truly settled and reexamining
an issue when the underlying circumstances seem genuinely to have
changed. Finally, the cardinal characteristic of settlement is that it is
autocratic; for the settlement proponent, the fact that the Court
takes a decision away from the people is the main benefit of judicial
decision, not a cost.95
Proponents of shared constitutional interpretation (including the
author of this Article) have also claimed that overlapping interpretive authority diminishes the Court’s “countermajoritarian difficulty.”96 In its classic form, the “difficulty” is that courts cannot act
meaningfully unless the political branches are willing to accept their
authority.97 This presents a dilemma when a court can anticipate
that its efforts to protect some politically unpopular right will encounter “massive resistance.”98 Professor Bickel famously argued
that, as a result, courts must at times be parsimonious with rights,
based on the theory that the public will tolerate only so much disturbance before it would simply defy judicial decree, and the courts
should do all they can to put off that day.99 The shared constitutional
interpretation theory draws significantly from Bickel’s argument,
claiming that by allowing other political actors to protect secondorder rights when there happens to be a coalition available, ready to
stand up for them, the judiciary can save itself from being the sole
target of majority discontent.100
Again, the exclusivity proponent has some answers. First, exclusivity, too, can conserve scarce judicial authority. In a regime where
settlement has truly taken hold, the Supreme Court would only have

question of justice resolved in the Court’s earlier interpretation of the Constitution, even if
the state law question involves a very differently worded state proviso.
95. See Alexander & Schauer, Defending Supremacy, supra note 18, at 467, 470.
96. See Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 159092 (2001); Galle, supra note 74, at 203-06; Post & Siegel, supra note 13, at 467-68; Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms,
91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1239-40 (1978). The phrase “countermajoritarian difficulty” was
coined in BICKEL, supra note 40, at 16.
97. See BICKEL, supra note 40, at 16-23.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 29-33; see also CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT:
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY 34-55 (1960); Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword: The High
Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 60-62
(1965).
100. See Post & Siegel, supra note 13, at 516-19. Private parties might also feel more
“ownership” in a plan that they helped create and thus be less resentful of what they might
otherwise have seen as a government imposition.
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to decide an issue once (unless it wanted itself to revisit the question).
The stability proponent also doubts that the countermajoritarian
difficulty is as serious as Bickel claimed. She believes that the public
will recognize that it needs a source of final authority.101 Thus, the
settlement proponent might first argue that the public at least sometimes will see the utility of the rule of law values she espouses, even
if public choice analysis suggests that it sometimes will not act on
that realization. Further, the settlement proponent can assert that
rational actors will recognize, as the drafters of a contract sometimes
do, that for a productive deal to move forward they need to agree that
any future disagreements will simply be decided by a judge.102
Naturally, none of these claims is even nearly universally true.
Again, the possibility of principled behavior by public officials may
swim against the tide of public cynicism. That cynicism is fed by the
inevitable likelihood that sometimes the practical benefits of adhering to judicial decision will be outweighed by the gains from “cheating” on settlement. Surely one deviation will not drive away investment or break the deal. Yet it will produce real gains for the cheater.
The more rampant the cheating, the more cynical we become. And so
our representatives play more and more often to what we want, and
not to what the Court tells us we ought to do. Still, the proponent of
stability can argue that its benefits at least slow this progression and
offer the possibility, however faint, of a virtuous circle in which the
public supports the Court in its efforts to protect stability and other
public goods from themselves and other would-be cheaters.
Thus the defender of judicial exclusivity has some fairly strong responses to the normative claims of its critics about the virtues of the
opportunities foregone by sticking to settlement above other values.
More than that, in the end she can answer them all with a shrug.
Yes, she might say, collaborative interpretation gives us “better” answers in some sense. But Alexander and Schauer concede that point
almost from the very start.103 Their claim is that settlement is more
valuable than any incremental gains in the “right” answer to a constitutional question that might flow from an alternative methodology.104 As a result, they make themselves virtually unassailable on
101. For a similar claim from an author who is not generally a strong proponent of stability, see Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596,
2606 (2003).
102. For discussion of the contract perspective, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 96 (6th ed. 2003) and Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory
and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 559-65 (2003).
103. See Alexander & Schauer, Defending Supremacy, supra note 18, at 468-70.
104. See id.; see also Emily Sherwin, Ducking Dred Scott: A Response to Alexander and
Schauer, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 65-67 (1998). Although Alexander and Schauer say that
their argument does not depend on the value of settlement per se, they then contend that
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the normative values of settlement, because it is largely incommensurable with the “better” results they waive aside. That is especially
true because our preference for more informed or democratic outcomes might vary depending on the underlying right that is to be decided. It may be more fruitful, then, to consider the negative case
against settlement. I do that in the next subsection.
3. The Dred Scott Decision
So it is difficult to say whether settlement, if it is all that its proponents say, compares favorably to the chance to reach better but
less predictable results. On the other hand, it is fairly easy to challenge the merits of settlement itself. Many critics of Alexander and
Schauer quickly pointed out that settlement is hardly desirable when
the rule that is settled is Dred Scott or Plessy v. Ferguson.105 Any system, these commentators say, that expects the political branches to
accept Dred Scott as binding authority is obviously wrong.106 That
point is fairly trenchant when the question is how the Executive
should respond to judicial interpretation—it dramatizes how high the
costs of abandoning better constitutional results can be. But it is almost irrelevant to my question, which is how the judiciary should respond to the Executive. We can hardly expect judges to agree that
their decisions can be freely disobeyed when “wrong.” If judicial decisions are to be anything other than friendly advice, they cannot invite litigants to disregard them when the litigants disagree.107 To the
extent that inviting alternative viewpoints improves inputs into the
judicial process or allows an opportunity for judicial reappraisal under changed facts, rules allowing reconsideration or reopening—with
the court’s consent—would serve the same function better.
Applying the settlement principle to Dred Scott, however, does
raise a serious weakness of the settlement case for exclusivity. Legal
settlement does not necessarily entail societal settlement. Rather, lein fact their claim rests on the “special function” of law, which of course turns out to be
that law has a settlement effect. Alexander & Schauer, Defending Supremacy, supra note
18, at 472-73. So, in short, their argument rests on the claim that their notion of what constitutes law’s “special function” is better than competing theories. Alexander, writing recently with Professor Solum, seems to abandon this position, arguing instead for an issueby-issue weighing of settlement values that would account for the benefits of flexibility in
particular subject areas. Alexander & Solum, supra note 24, at 1632-34.
105. Devins & Fisher, supra note 15, at 99-100; see also Paulsen, supra note 17, at 271.
106. See Devins & Fisher, supra note 15, at 99-100.
107. Of course, one could imagine a system in which courts are only neutral advisers in
a consensual dispute-resolution process. But if that were all that a litigant wanted, it
would go to a mediator. Let us, then, define “court” as that institution, among several possible advice-givers, whose decisions are binding. Our question then is: What attitude could
we expect the decisionmakers of that institution to take regarding defiance of its judgments? Tolerance is a highly unlikely attitude because then the institution no longer offers
anything to distinguish it from merely advisory institutions, among other reasons.

2005]

JUSTICE OF ADMINISTRATION

183

gal settlement only shifts the debate from what the law is to whether
the law should be disobeyed.108 Similarly, a regime in which constitutional law was highly settled might result in a correlative response
from political actors, who might (in government) streamline the
amendment process or (in the private sector) develop institutions to
mobilize affected constituencies for a national effort to change the
law.
Alexander and Schauer seem to acknowledge this argument, but
claim that settlement at least results in more stability and less debate than we would have otherwise.109 They assert that because the
debate about whether to disobey the law begins with a heavy presumption that the law ought to be obeyed, in most cases legal settlement will substantially end social disagreement as well.110 That assertion presumes that law exerts some significant psychological force
on citizens. For the reasons I have just explained, law’s binding psychological force to some extent depends on public perception that defying the law is wrong.111 Thus, disobedience grows as it goes, so that
relatively isolated protests may over time lead to more widespread
weakening of law’s settling power. Call it the “broken windows” theory of constitutional law.
In short, Alexander and Schauer seem somewhat to overstate the
extent to which settlement in fact settles. And, of course, a law that
is widely disobeyed is not especially predictable. Again, though, this
is not exactly a disqualifying argument. It might be that settlement,
however hobbled, is still more valuable than the values of cooperation, but that looks increasingly tenuous.
B. Why Not Settle for Judicial Review?
Suppose now that we continue with the assumption that stability
is our premiere value, and we are satisfied that the judiciary is
uniquely qualified to promote it. Turn back then to the central question: How should a court respond to an agency that defends its regulation as a product of constitutional reasoning? I would argue that
the two premises we have accepted so far (that is, the value of stability and judicial preeminence in defending it) are inadequate to explain why a court would be obligated to invalidate the regulation. In
108. See Alexander & Schauer, Defending Supremacy, supra note 18, at 472 n.50;
Devins & Fisher, supra note 15, at 91; Whittington, supra note 63, at 798-99.
109. See Alexander & Schauer, Extrajudicial Interpretation, supra note 18, at 1386;
Schauer, supra note 56, at 1048-49.
110. Alexander & Schauer, Extrajudicial Interpretation, supra note 18, at 1386.
111. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text; see also Frank I. Michelman, Relative Constraint and Public Reason: What Is “The Work We Expect of Law”?, 67 BROOK. L.
REV. 963, 972-73 (2002) (arguing that individuals will accept law when they see that others comply).
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other words, for stability at least, it is possible to decouple the justification for judicial review from the presumed rationale for exclusivity.
The heart of the problem for exclusivity is a tension between Article
III limits on the independent and case-specific nature of federal judicial decision and the policymaking role of an agency.
In brief, judicial exclusivity and modern regulation challenge each
other because, for the most part, the agency acts first. It is the
agency that formulates policy in advance of any actual controversy;
often, no justiciable antagonistic relationship arises until the
agency’s policy is so far developed that it is clear how private parties
will be affected.112 Indeed, rules of standing aside, Article III arguably limits judicial review of agency policy to “final” agency actions because review before that point might be the equivalent of an advisory
opinion.113 Therefore, when agency regulation involves “novel” constitutional issues, the agency will often need to resolve them in the first
instance without the benefit of judicial involvement, or risk developing and implementing its resolution without knowing if its plans will
comply with future judge-made constitutional law.
At first glance, it is hard to see why we should prohibit preliminary interpretation by other actors even if we agree that stability is
important and judges are best positioned to defend it.114 The uncertainty and disputatiousness that exclusivity aims at eliminating will
persist until the reviewing court issues its decision, whether or not
the agency acknowledges and tries to account for the possible constitutional problem. So there is no obvious stability benefit to foreclosing pre-judicial interpretation. And, as other commentators have observed, there are substantial benefits to the Court in having the insights of other branches before rendering its own decision: the Court
can learn about a wider range of policy implications, consider popular
views of what may be competing notions of justice, and so on.115 If we
are going to lock in a rule, we ought to lock in a good one.
The problem here is that if judicial exclusivity makes such modest
claims on agencies, it becomes redundant. Judicial consideration of
an agency decision after it has been made, where that consideration
accepts the validity of the initial agency analysis but probes its accuracy, is not exclusivity at all. It is judicial review. Exclusivity is only
meaningful in an Article III world if it in some way would cause

112. See Gant, supra note 62, at 394-95; Monaghan, supra note 12, at 5.
113. 2 PIERCE, supra note 10, § 15.12, at 1052.
114. See Alexander & Schauer, Extrajudicial Interpretation, supra note 18, at 1360.
115. See Elhauge, supra note 1, at 2127-28, 2137; Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 928 (2003).
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courts to reject interpretations that would survive review for Merryman and Klein supremacy.116
But this is not the end of our inquiry; exclusivity likely demands
more than judicial review alone. I placed “novel” in quotation marks
quite deliberately. There are at least three varieties of novelty to
consider. First is the basic blank slate novelty: no court has ruled on
the issue before.117 Next is a situation where the problems of application can be so indeterminate that the novelty is essentially a blank
slate: does privacy of the home include privacy in one’s infrared
emissions?118 And last, an agency could argue that recent experience
in applying the present rule, or other change of circumstances, so
throws the Court’s premise into question that any reasonable person
would assume that the Court would want to revisit its rule.
The challenge for the judicial exclusivity proponent lies in deciding whether to distinguish between these categories, and if so, how.119
Each additional layer of “novelty,” as I have sketched them, extentuates the trade-off between stability and the amount of information a
court has available when formulating and enforcing a rule over time.
By hypothesis, we assume that judges must prefer consistent answers over “right” answers. But each of the three layers is faithful in
its fashion. Must the stability proponent always prefer the most stable set of rules? Or can exclusivity be carved so that courts can capture some benefits of joint regulation while striving to stay predictable enough to capture most of the benefits of stability?
If we opt for maximum stability, then it is arguably the case that
we would have to prohibit agencies from engaging even in genuine
blank slate constitutional consideration. Efforts to distinguish among
different forms of “novelty”—some permissible, some not—will be
hard to predict, the object of considerable debate, and subject to political gaming by the executive and private parties. Obviously, the
lines between these categories or between any one of them and law
that is not “novel” at all are not bright. They call up all of the familiar and age-old problems of defining precedent and holding.120 To
116. In other words, review to ensure that the decision was correct. For my explanation
of Merryman and Klein supremacy, see supra text accompanying notes 43-47.
117. See Gant, supra note 62, at 395.
118. See Dorf, supra note 10, at 11-12 (observing that because of inherent value judgments in applying constitutional terms, “there is no such thing as ‘adhering’ to an old
meaning in a new context”).
119. Cf. Paulsen, supra note 17, at 272 (arguing that there is no significant difference
between executive interpretation when there is a prior judicial decision on point and when
there is not); Whittington, supra note 63, at 790 (considering trade-offs between different
layers of stability and benefits of cooperation).
120. See, e.g., Lawson & Moore, supra note 17, at 1296-97 (discussing the “degree to
which a content based theory of interpretation . . . can generate clear answers to constitutional questions); Monaghan, supra note 59, at 763-67 (analyzing “[t]he meaning of precedent”).
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those dilemmas we must now add considerations about whether
binding precedent for a court should also be binding on an extrajudicial entity. Plainly, some of the debate over how to categorize a new
policy will necessarily involve the merits of the underlying set of constitutional values. For example, whether a policy involves a new application of settled precedent may depend on what values underlie
the prior holding. For all these reasons, permitting debate about
whether an issue is novel, and if so, whether in a permissible or impermissible way, may be the same as allowing debate on the constitutional question itself. Thus, for the defender of settlement as the
premiere value, novelty is an all-or-nothing proposition.121
Again, if this is the goal of exclusivity, judicial review alone might
be sufficient in reaching it. This view of the stability rationale is, in
essence, a negative image of one argument in favor of textualist interpretation of statutes.122 I mention this parallel, however imperfect,
because it raises a thorny point for the advocate of exclusivity. The
rationale for legislative exclusivity—that is, for textualism—includes
an argument that is not really available when we talk about judicial
exclusivity. As Judge Calabresi pointed out long ago, what is genuinely at stake in arguments about judicial interpretation of statutes
is the burden of inertia.123 Congress or an agency can always fix judicial “mistakes,” but that imposes significant costs not only on the
government entity, but also on the enacting coalitions. These costs
include the burdens of monitoring judicial decisions, identifying old
or new allies, reorganizing, and cranking up the lobbying apparatus
for another round.124 In contrast, judicial review of “wrong” or destabilizing decisions by extrajudicial actors can be had much more read121. See Sherwin, supra note 104, at 68. It is worth mentioning again that my analysis
ignores “predictive” interpretation—interpretations in which an agency is simply trying to
decide whether it will comply with what a court has held or would hold. Exclusivity has no
quarrel with predictive interpretations because they acknowledge, rather than deviate
from, judicial control. Cf. Monaghan, supra note 12, at 26 (noting that we could view
agency legal interpretation simply as an announcement to the public of the position the
agency will attempt to argue in court).
122. That is, some textualists assert that the political branches are more expert in
their policy judgments and more accountable to public preferences. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 10, at 625-26. In the starkest versions of the accountability argument, regulation
is described as the result of a deal between conflicting interest groups who use the political
process to memorialize the outcome of their agreement. See Easterbrook, supra note 73, at
540-44. In either case, the claim is that judges cannot be trusted to alter the express terms
of legislation. Even though later judicial modification might help keep a “deal” consistent
with what the parties intended over time, the concurrent danger is that the court will use
modified circumstances as a pretext to impose its own preferences or will simply err and
unseat what the original enacting coalition might have wanted. Similarly, the rationale for
judicial exclusivity just described would place strict limits on extrajudicial interpretation
in order to reduce opportunities for agencies to intentionally or inadvertently unsettle
what the judiciary has established.
123. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 92 (1982).
124. Id. at 92-93.
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ily125—as illustrated by the traditional resistance to judicial review
among those who generally prefer majoritarian decisionmaking.126
Put another way, why is judicial exclusivity necessary if there is already judicial supremacy?127
Carefully tailored judicial review could achieve at least some of
the same ends as judicial exclusivity. Start with constitutional jurisprudence that leans more to Scalia than O’Connor—that is, that favors bright lines and formalism over nuanced, case-specific balancing
of underlying values. That would make it considerably easier to recognize the bounds of a precedent, perhaps to the point where disputes about what is truly novel are unlikely to affect planning. Because there is little underlying content, there is not much danger
that in trying to draw new distinctions we will be drawn into a
wasteful debate about fundamental values. Another jurisprudential
move could be to push the boundaries of what constitutes an advisory
opinion, allowing judicial review to slide backward in time into the
administrative process. That maneuver at least cuts down on the
amount of time that new controversies would remain unresolved.
And with rulings issued before the administrative process is final,
there is a smaller impact both on private planning (which presumably is unlikely itself to gel before the ultimate shape of the rule is
known) and the efforts of the agency to guess what the court might
think of its possible outcomes. In addition, courts might adopt doctrines that penalize agencies for changing course—such as adopting
a default rule that favors the status quo, giving lower deference or
requiring more extensive processes for changes in administrative position, and so forth. Similar rules could heavily penalize regulators if
their constitutional judgments are in error—for example, by striking
down the entire regulation instead of severing the unconstitutional
portions.128 The result should be a more stable regulatory field, and
one where regulators are reluctant to alter constitutional doctrine on
their own.129

125. Id. at 4-6.
126. Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison’s Vision of the State: A Public Choice
Perspective, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1328, 1342-43 (1994); see also Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as
Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV.
1033, 1038 (1968) (describing this view); Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public
Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1221-22 (1982) (same).
127. See Gant, supra note 62, at 392.
128. See Vermeule, supra note 38, at 1962-63.
129. See 1 PIERCE, supra note 10, § 7.4, at 456-57 (arguing that more vigorous review
of rulemaking procedure deters agencies from using the procedure to resolve major political disputes); Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1387-1436 (1992) (describing how a myriad of agency review techniques discourages agencies from innovation and flexibility); cf. Monaghan, supra note 59,
at 752 (observing that strong precedent is conservative and stabilizing).
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Taken severally or as a whole, these jurisprudential tactics may
reasonably approximate the level of constitutional predictability that
could be achieved by a regime of exclusive judicial interpretation.
Like that regime, each jurisprudential tactic seems to achieve stability at the cost of accuracy, or at least better information and accountability. I doubt that the judicial review alternative is one that
we would welcome if we were not willing to value stability above all.
But the point is that exclusivity may not be necessary, even if stability is our highest value and the judiciary is the institution best able
to preserve it.
If the tactics of judicial review have a weak point in this analysis,
it is that they do not seem to quite match exclusivity in foreclosing
wasteful public debate. Bright doctrinal lines might simply lead to
repeated efforts to further the same constitutional values along different paths. Formalism may lead to foment as much as finality. The
tactic of weakening the severability doctrine could be undermined if
determined proponents of an issue insert a poison pill in a valuable
piece of regulation precisely in order to force the Court to strike the
whole down so that what seems like a penalty in fact rewards the
proponents with a “defeat” that energizes their supporters towards
amendment or disobedience. However swiftly judicial review may occur, there will still be a window of time in which some extrajudicial
constitutional debate will begin to bubble.
But these weak points are not fatal. For one thing, it is not certain
to what extent the argument for stability rests on the claim that issues can and ought to be forever decided, rather than that settlement
cuts off at least drawn-out and unresolvable disagreement. Judicial
review can accomplish the latter. Further, since what we are considering is a rule for evaluating the validity of a regulation, it must itself be enforced by the judiciary. Thus, wasteful constitutional debate
could arise between the time a regulation is contemplated and when
it is struck down, regardless of whether we accept exclusivity.
More fundamentally, exclusivity offers no comparative settlement
advantage over judicial review, because exclusivity only submerges
executive constitutional reasoning. That is, when we speak very
broadly of whether judicial exclusivity is a wise principle, as Alexander and Schauer do, we presumably addresses ourselves not only to
judges but also to Presidents and administrators. If the President is
persuaded, we need not worry whether he or she will try to evade the
strictures of exclusivity. But when we speak, as I do here, of exclusivity as a rule for how judges should behave when reviewing executive
action, then we have to consider seriously how executive actors are
likely to respond.
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The likely response to a judicial rule prohibiting constitutional
reasoning as a component of rulemaking is almost surely a rhetorical
layering of technical or other policy jargon on top of (and as a cover
for) what is actually constitutional reasoning. On a psychological
level, agency personnel probably will not want to stop thinking about
justice, fairness, and individual rights—exactly for the reasons exclusivity relies upon. Questions of justice are too fundamental to relinquish and sometimes too sharply defined to compromise.130 Indeed,
their political intractability is what makes the settlement function so
attractive.131 At the same time, because constituents have similarly
deep feelings about rights and may find it easier to identify and organize with others who share their views about a particular right,
there is significant political pressure on agencies to account for rights
on some level.132
To the extent that judicial exclusivity allows “submerged” constitutional reasoning to persist, and policymakers and the public are
aware that it persists, judicial exclusivity fails to settle divisive social
disagreement. Of course, as Boerne itself demonstrates, courts can
always respond to this problem by extending the reach of exclusivity
to legislation that, in the Court’s view, is in some significant sense
“really” a constitutional decision.133 That approach has its own costs.
As courts chase constitutional judgments further down the rabbit
hole of policy justifications, the real reasons for public enactments
grow increasingly opaque. Some court determinations are bound to
be wrong, needlessly striking down a pure policy decision. So an aggressive, Boerne-like stance on submerged constitutional reasoning is
likely significantly to reduce the democratic character of regulation.
There are also practical difficulties. Suppose, for example, a regulation relaxing controls on state ozone emissions that throughout the
administrative record seems to rest entirely on an analysis of the effects of ozone transport on human respiration. In fact, however, the
agency selected its rule in order to please state lobbyists who believe
that a federalist reading of the Constitution made the regulation unconstitutional (although there is no direct proof of this fact). Should a
court strike down any regulation that favors an interest group that
has taken a controversial constitutional stance?

130. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 180-94, 475-80 (rev. ed. 1999).
131. See Alexander & Schauer, Extrajudicial Interpretation, supra note 18, at 1375-76.
132. See Galle, supra note 74, at 198-99. Constitutional reasoning by agencies is also
inevitable in another sense. Every act by a governmental actor is a product of a constitutional interpretation—a decision about the scope of the actor’s authority. See United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §
3-4 (3d ed. 2000); Lawson & Moore, supra note 17, at 1286-87.
133. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
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Finally, there is a sizable subset of all executive decisions that are
almost completely unreviewable by courts.134 Among the most prominent decisions are pardons and vetoes, both of which have historically been loci for Presidents’ decisions that the Constitution justified
or required a particular outcome.135 Decisions not to prosecute or not
to bring a civil enforcement action generally require no public justification and cannot be challenged.136 Commentators have argued that
both decisions offer opportunities for exercise of executive constitutional reasoning—for example, by declining to bring prosecutions
where the executive concludes an application of the statute would be
unconstitutional.137 One classic example is the Department of Justice’s “Petite Policy,” which limits the discretion of prosecutors to
bring charges where the Double Jeopardy Clause might be implicated.138 Obviously, as competing rules for judicial review of executive
action, neither exclusivity nor review can do much to affect directly
how the executive conducts its affairs in these areas, other than
through the hope that by announcing a principle it will persuade the
executive to go along, either directly or through popular pressure.
The point is that, assuming such persuasive efforts will not be entirely effective, there will remain under either regime a significant
amount of extrajudicial constitutional debate. Neither approach can
claim to “settle” contentious discussion entirely. The question, therefore, is necessarily one of degrees of partial success.
Taken together, the costs of a vigorous search for pretext and the
challenging task of identifying it accurately mean that generally
courts will not be able to eliminate submerged constitutional reasoning. Thus, they will be unlikely significantly to curtail social disagreement. It is certainly the case that exclusivity has the capacity to
reduce wasteful disputation. But so does judicial review generally.
In summary, the “settlement” case for precluding agencies from
interpreting the constitution is not persuasive. It is true that the political market is unlikely to be as successful as the judiciary in defending stability. It does not seem to follow, however, that agencies
should be prohibited from interpreting the Constitution in the first
134. See Johnsen, supra note 17, at 115; Paulsen, supra note 17, at 264-65; see also
Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 77, at 1306 (making a similar point about congressional
decisionmaking).
135. See Lawson & Moore, supra note 17, at 1280, 1288-89; Paulsen, supra note 17, at
264-65.
136. See Johnsen, supra note 17, at 115; Paulsen, supra note 17, at 267-68. I say “generally” because there are rare situations, such as where a defendant makes out a prima facie case of vindictive or selective prosecution, in which the prosecutor may be obliged to explain why she declined to bring charges against one person but not another who seems
similarly situated.
137. See Lawson & Moore, supra note 17, at 1280.
138. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-2.031 (2005), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam.
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instance, subject to some form of judicial review. Exclusivity may
somewhat settle constitutional law, but so would carefully tailored
judicial review. Given the costs of exclusivity—lost information,
waste of administrative resources, lack of transparency—it is not obvious why judicial exclusivity is preferable to narrower forms of judicial supremacy, even if it is accepted that the courts’ “settlement”
function is more important than other values.
IV. INSTITUTIONAL ADVANTAGE PART TWO: GETTING RIGHTS RIGHT?
There is now one remaining loose end. Settlement, as we have
seen, is not a persuasive justification for exclusive judicial interpretation of the Constitution. This is so notwithstanding the fact that
settlement is a public good and the judiciary, therefore, is more likely
to be able to preserve it. But what of other public goods, other second-order preferences, other rights?139 Is there a credible argument
that the judiciary is uniquely capable of preserving certain kinds of
rights, so that we should prohibit other actors even from interpreting
them?
This terrain is already very well mapped, and the answer is “no.”
As a wide variety of commentators have pointed out, judicial enforcement of rights—even in a regime where judges are only superior, and not exclusive, interpreters—raises problems of paternalism.140 That is, there is always risk that the “public good” the court
hypothesizes will not match what the public would really prefer, but
rather matches the court’s own (and perhaps idiosyncratic or illinformed) values. Exclusivity greatly heightens this risk by reducing
opportunities for courts to confront alternatives and to see their consequences played out over time.141 If our goal is to get “right” answers, we should instead want to minimize such risks.
A small group of writers has recently suggested a related, although more circumscribed, claim. They acknowledge the general
virtues of collaborative interpretation, but argue that courts might
legitimately be exclusive, or at least have the power of review, in
139. See Friedman, supra note 101, at 2601-02 (arguing for role of judicial review in
promoting “longstanding and deeply held constitutional views”); Gant, supra note 62, at
391 (same). I use “second-order preferences” in Schauer’s sense, which is to say a set of
preferences that “serve to exclude otherwise good first-order reasons, or to include otherwise bad first-order reasons,” for the purpose of protecting long-term values not adequately
taken into account in forming the first-order preferences, or in order to exclude short-term
preferences that are based on mistaken assumptions. Schauer, supra note 56, at 1046 n.2.
140. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 17, at 236-37; Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of
Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 389 (1986); Lawson & Moore, supra
note 17, at 1298; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Agency Authority to Define the Scope of Private
Rights of Action, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1996); Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 126, at
1208-09.
141. See Monaghan, supra note 46, at 28-29; Post & Siegel, supra note 13, at 514-15.
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those areas where courts are most “competent” or politics least
trustworthy.142 Evidently, the suggestion is that this allocation of institutional authority is less value-laden, and so less threatened by
the problem of paternalism.143 Yet we must have criteria to evaluate
competency. If the judiciary shall claim exclusivity in some areas, it
is the judiciary that must determine those criteria and referee
them.144 Thus, there is no reason to believe that dividing exclusive interpretive power by competency results in decisions that are any
more objective, uncontroversial, or “right” than other judicial value
judgments, which everyone concedes are best made when shared.145
I want to highlight two less familiar points. The “countermajoritarian difficulty,” as I mentioned, may be a significant limitation on judicial capacity to protect rights. At the very least, judges
now seem to see popular dismay as a consideration they should take
into account in their rights calculus.146 If the goal is to protect rights
both accurately and thoroughly, we should be interested in opportunities to further them with minimal political resistance. And so, as
commentators like Robert Post and Reva Siegel have argued, courts
ought to nurture constitutional deliberation by political actors where
it sprouts, as long as they can be reasonably sure that the deliberation will generally preserve rights as the court defines them.147 More
than that, the court should try to shift responsibility for making the
ultimate constitutional decision to the political actors—let Congress
or an agency take the blame.148 Exclusivity, either literally or
through judicial review that limits political invocations of the Constitution strictly to meanings the Court has already elaborated, would
(or, depending on how we read Boerne, does) make both of these tactics very difficult. Limiting judicial review to ensure that political interpretations remain within a range of possible constitutional meanings, each of which is more or less adequately protective of the rights
the Court is interested in, would expand judicial capacity and dis-

142. See Alexander & Solum, supra note 24, at 1633; Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of
Judicial Review: The Perils of Popular Constitutionalism, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 673, 679-80;
Johnsen, supra note 17, at 127-28; Peabody, supra note 17, at 72.
143. For example, Professors Alexander and Solum seem to offer institutional competence as a response to Jeremy Waldron’s complaint that settlement by courts is inferior to
settlement by representative majoritarian bodies. Alexander & Solum, supra note 24, at
1631, 1633.
144. See Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 77, at 1294 (noting that in order to judge
Congress’s performance as a constitutional interpreter, we must first choose “some particular substantive account of constitutional interpretation”).
145. Cf. Fallon, supra note 41, at 142 (“[T]he Court’s definition of its function always
remains open to challenge as a matter of first principle.”).
146. See Devins & Fisher, supra note 15, at 91.
147. Post & Siegel, supra note 13, at 516-17.
148. See id. at 517-18.
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tribute credit or blame for the final form of the right between the
court and its political partner.149
Additionally, exclusivity undermines psychological supports that
might otherwise prop up political respect for rights. Again, principled
behavior is partly created by societal expectation, which both frames
how an individual actor approaches a problem and also puts external
pressure on the actor to comply with the expected norm. I argued
earlier that our federal judiciary begins with the high expectation
that it will resist popular pressure because its institutional design
was obviously conceived to achieve that effect and was publicly justified on that basis. Judicial insistence on exclusive judicial interpretation could have the opposite effect on the expectations for nonjudicial
interpretation. If the judiciary’s view is at all credible, it will lead the
public to conclude that political actors should not be expected to interpret the Constitution, and that they are not capable of principled
behavior. This prophecy may quickly become self-fulfilling. That in
turn puts more and more pressure on the judiciary to reject that
which would then become perceived as increasingly unprincipled political products.
In contrast, ordinary judicial review might strengthen nonjudicial
policymakers’ inclinations to interpret rights. It is possible, as Professor Tushnet writes, that judicial review may create a sort of judicial overhang, in which Congress or an agency does not bother to
think about the constitutional consequences of what it does, because
it knows a court will.150 But if that is because regulators prefer to
avoid waste, the more rational strategy would often be to avoid the
penalties of constitutional invalidity, especially in an initiative with
substantial start-up costs.151
More importantly, injecting the judiciary into the regulatory process, at least as an arbiter of intractable disputes, may have a salutory effect on the self-image of all of the collaboration partners.
149. I would add that exclusivity is a particular problem in our federal constitutional
system, which limits courts to decide only discrete cases or controversies. Sometimes the
best solution to a policy problem that causes the violation of rights may lie outside the
grasp of a single court, even a court representing a class of plaintiffs. Cf. Monaghan, supra
note 46, at 29 (noting that Congress has power to analyze problems and remedy the violation of rights not open to courts); Whittington, supra note 63, at 821 (“[I]t is possible for extrajudicial institutions to give greater solicitude and to be more capable of responding to
individual rights concerns than judicial bodies bound by the limits of legal interpretation
and dispute resolution.”).
150. TUSHNET, supra note 42, at 57-65.
151. I am eliding a number of complications here that have been sketched thoroughly
by others. For example, severability doctrine plays a significant role in regulators’ incentives. Some regulators might invite invalidation so that they can extract rents twice for
enacting the same piece of legislation. Still, I agree the dominant strategy, even under the
present, rather forgiving approach to severability, will be to give at least some thought to
what a court will do in response to the regulation.
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Again, institutional behavior is to some extent a self-fulfilling prophecy. Sometimes regulators are public-minded because they are conditioned to believe that is the socially appropriate behavior, and it is
painful for human beings to violate social norms, especially those
norms that are role-related.152 Judges too can have institutional ideals, which, again, may include a belief that their duty is to protect
“rights.”153 The same ideals may filter down to other participants in
the legal system. These ideals may also be reinforced by ritualized
role-definition, such as in the attorney’s oath. Perhaps collaborative
regulation participants, if made to feel that what they are participating in is truly “law” rather than just another deal, will be more inclined to think of themselves as legal actors bound to respect established rule and principle. And judicial review, like other features of
divided government, dampens the rate of policymaking reaction, assuring that there is time for republican deliberation about the direction of reform.154
Thus, exclusivity may unnecessarily place a heavy burden on
judges by closing off the possibility of principled second-order decisionmaking by political institutions. And it may place courts in the
position of seeking remedies the Constitution, as it is presently written, puts beyond their reach. If our primary objective is to maximize
protection for rights and realize the best possible solution to rights
dilemmas, then exclusivity is an unattractive strategy.
V. THE VIEW FROM THE BENCH: RHETORIC AND THE INSTITUTIONAL
IDEOLOGY OF JUDGING
In the preceding Parts, I have focused on what we might call the
exterior view of judicial functioning. That is, I have largely asked
what allocation of powers an objective designer—a constitutional
framer, perhaps—would want to set. In this, I have followed the prevailing literature, which has considered these questions almost exclusively from that perspective.155 But by standing behind a veil of objectivity, we may have missed how exclusivity looks from behind the
bench. The judiciary may have its own unique institutional needs for
claiming interpretive exclusivity when it reviews the decisions of
other branches.
I argue in this Part that the very assertion of exclusivity, even if it
proves not entirely effective, may serve an important role in the judi152. See Suchman & Edelman, supra note 80, at 919-20.
153. See id. at 926-27.
154. See KRAMER, supra note 17, at 112-14.
155. See, e.g., Alexander & Schauer, Extrajudicial Interpretation, supra note 18, at
1363; Johnsen, supra note 17, at 113; Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding
Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 44 (1993); Paulsen, supra note 17, at 286-87; Whittington, supra note 63, at 797.
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ciary’s overall operation. In Part V.A. I consider first the place of exclusivity in what I describe as the traditional account of judicial
rhetoric, which posits that judicial rhetoric is generally aimed at disarming public resistance to unpopular defenses of minority rights or
other second-order preferences. My view is that, as in Part IV, a
court that invokes exclusivity likely undermines its ultimate ability
to set policy independent of the political branches.
Part V.B. discusses what I believe is a more novel explanation for
the rhetoric of exclusivity: it is aimed within, at the Justices themselves, their successors, and the lower courts they supervise. The
language of exclusivity, I argue, may be part of the Court’s way of
creating and reinforcing an institutional ideology, carving a public
ideal to which Justices and judges will aspire and sometimes adhere.
I conclude that although this social psychological perspective has
considerable explanatory power, it does not quite justify exclusivity
in all aspects of constitutional reasoning and predicts only weakly, if
at all, the aspects of constitutional reasoning in which exclusivity
must be had.
A. The Balance Pole: Exclusivity as Mollifying Rhetoric
If our project in this Part is to justify exclusivity to judges, let us
begin with the assumption that courts want to be effective at what
they do. Public interest minded judges want to defend the populace
against ill-advised efforts to disregard minority rights or erode other
collective goods. Majoritarian judges want to marshall popular attention against regional defiance. Even rationally self-interested judges
with future gains on their minds will want to maximize the power of
their decisions, so that their influence merits larger rewards.
Not surprisingly, some accounts of federal judging suggest that
the operation of judicial review and the judicial language that accompanies it are designed to make it easier for federal courts to make
policy.156 Again, the conventional story begins with the claim that
federal courts must overcome the countermajoritarian difficulty in
order to have any long-term efficacy.157 That is, when courts make
decisions contrary to short-term political preferences, or at least contrary to what elected officials would choose, they generate resent-

156. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 17, at 237; Gregory Casey, The Supreme Court and
Myth: An Empirical Investigation, 8 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 385, 409 (1974) (arguing that “mythology” of neutral and objective judicial decisionmaking creates public support); Devins &
Fisher, supra note 15, at 93-94; Gant, supra note 62, at 401-02 (claiming that “myth” of judicial finality and authoritativeness promotes public support for courts).
157. See Devins & Fisher, supra note 15, at 96-97.
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ment.158 Over time, resentment becomes resistance.159 Yet, the judiciary is not truly final; it depends on the political branches, perhaps
the very branches it is defying, to enforce its decrees and to grant it
jurisdiction to continue supervision of any particular controversy.160
Judicial rhetoric then becomes a balancing pole courts can use to
negotiate the tightrope between countermajoritarian action and public acceptance. One of the major sources of public resistance, it is
said, is that the general public may perceive judicial action as a simple substitution of the court’s own value or policy preference for the
public’s own.161 This perception is aggravating not only because the
public does not get what it wants but also because it may seem as
though the judges are engaging in self-dealing, making decisions that
further their own interests or elitist moral code over that of the rest
of the community.162 Judicial rhetoric may aim to defuse at least the
suspicion of self-dealing by attributing decisions to something other
than what the judges themselves want—to precedent, to “the Framers,” to “strict construction” of the Constitution, or something similar.163 Consider Bush v. Gore, where the Court framed its discussion
with a reminder that voting rights routinely are limited by “properly
established legal requirements.”164 Justice Stevens, in the powerful
conclusion to his dissent, warned that despite such efforts, the
Court’s reason for its decision,165 distrust of the principled reasoning
offered by the Florida Supreme Court, would undermine public confidence in the objectivity of judicial decisions.166
There are several other points here as well. First, referring to
widely shared collective public decisions of the past helps a court to
claim that its audience shared in some part in the creation of the
158. See id. at 91; Friedman, supra note 50, at 349-50; Michael J. Klarman, Brown,
Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 85-129 (1994); Monaghan,
supra note 59, at 753.
159. See Devins & Fisher, supra note 15, at 91; Klarman, supra note 158, at 85-129;
Monaghan, supra note 59, at 753.
160. See Paulsen, supra note 17, at 223.
161. See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part
Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383, 1448-54 (2001).
162. See id.; Friedman, supra note 50, at 351; Keith J. Bybee, Legal Realism, Common
Courtesy, and Hypocrisy, 1 LAW, CULTURE & HUMAN. 75, 81 (2005).
163. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 999-1001 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Bybee, supra note 162, passim; Monaghan, supra note 59, at 752 (citing
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970)); Whittington, supra note 63, at
809 (discussing Marshall’s view of distinction between law and politics); cf. KRAMER, supra
note 17, at 98, 103 (noting that early judges staked claims to power of judicial review by
asserting that they were acting as faithful agents for the people who had ratified the Constitution); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 19-22 (2000) (arguing that groups develop norms against self-dealing in order to signal that they are trustworthy bargaining
partners for future deals).
164. 531 U.S. 98, 103 (2000).
165. And, impliedly, its decision generally.
166. Bush, 531 U.S. at 128-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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outcome, which tends to reduce resentment and resistance.167 Further, the language of “principle” might also appeal to our intuitive
sense that in a republic we ought to accept principled applications of
common basic ideals, even if we disagree with the outcome of a particular application.168 Even if this is not a feature of a basic understanding of what it means to live in a modern Western republic,169
grounding judicial decision in the vocabulary of principle may at
least suggest to the disagreeing public that their views, too, if permissible principled interpretations, may prevail in the future.
Of course, judicial rhetoric can also be a more straightforward effort to persuade. The Court might overturn the popular preference of
the moment but argue that having an institution that defends rights
is in the long-term interests of everyone: it protects public goods, offers some long-term settlement of political disagreement, and provides all the other benefits that have already been seen. The Court
may also try to use language not simply to persuade but to battle collective action problems that might have produced a temporary preference contrary to the Court’s position.170 The public might not have
learned all it could about an issue or thought all it could about the
justice of a policy, because individuals assumed that if learning and
pondering were worthwhile someone else would do it and act on it. A
slumbering national majority that might not have taken action to
correct localized injustice might be mobilized by a judicial call to
arms.
Finally, when courts speak and write using the vocabulary of fundamental rights and constitutional command, they may be appealing
to the special moral commitments of citizens. Consider, for example,
a possible communitarian claim.171 Invoking the Constitution, the
Framers, precedent, and principle may be a way of arguing that the
Court’s decision is implied or required by common American ideals.
That gives the opinion not only unique moral weight but also at least
implicitly makes a claim on the community’s common commitment to
what it means to be a member of that community. Or, as I have suggested elsewhere, the language of constitutional interpretation, especially historically grounded interpretations, may imply a duty to obey

167. See Devins & Fisher, supra note 15, at 90-98.
168. See Michelman, supra note 111, at 975-76; Monaghan, supra note 59, at 748-49.
169. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 189-90, 198-99 (1986).
170. See Dorf, supra note 10, at 78; Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private
Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129 (1986).
171. Communitarians, although widely varied in their methods and conclusions, generally agree that justice arises out of shared definitions of what it means to be a proper
member of a given community. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 169, at 19-215; MICHAEL J.
SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 329-51
(1996).
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out of Lockean obligation or a sense of fair play.172 The Court frames
its decision as a necessary incident of rules that existed before its decision, while the audience was enjoying the benefits of living in a society bounded by those rules. The implication is that it is now not fair
for the public to object to a rule it has benefited from or could have
avoided by exiting.173
On a superficial level, exclusivity seems a reasonable tool for
achieving these goals. By appearing to divide legal reasoning into
two spheres—one constitutional and exclusive to judges, the other
political and open to all—courts can emphasize the unique and distinctive status of constitutional reasoning. That status reinforces judicial claims that countermajoritarian outcomes are not simply substitutions of judicial policy preference, but products of an entirely different mode of reasoning, one that produces “right” answers to interpretations of constitutional text.174 Exclusivity might highlight for a
doubting populace the unique value of an apolitical institution capable of resisting momentary pressures to preserve stability or other
second-order preferences. With only one voice speaking, it is easier
for the Court to persuade or lead opinion; uniqueness focuses attention on the solitary speaker and, obviously, makes dissenting positions more difficult to elaborate. This last point is especially important if the Court wants to rely on claims of moral obligation to comply with its views. In the modern era, rights regularly come into conflict, and the most controversial judicial decisions balance conflicting
claims of right or justice.175 Consider the abortion debate or claims of
individual freedom from putatively intrusive law enforcement efforts
said to protect the community as a whole. If the Court concedes that
other political actors also have legitimate roles in constitutional interpretation, then the moral force of the Court’s interpretation is
greatly diminished when its view is contrary to the balance struck, or
said to be struck, by another branch.176
172. Galle, supra note 74, at 217-18.
173. I am not endorsing contractual theories of social obligation, but rather only observing that they may be one form of obligation a court asserts against citizens.
174. See Whittington, supra note 63, at 809-11.
175. See Galle, supra note 74, at 218-19.
176. Id. This point, if one accepts it, suggests that Paulsen would probably have to accept my view if he gave his attention to the rule the judiciary should adopt for the scope of
its own power. He argues that independent executive interpretation is constrained by the
“formidable moral and political power” of judicial interpretations on overlapping subjects.
Paulsen, supra note 17, at 301-02. Indeed, this constraint is central to his argument, for he
concedes that without his version of interpretive checks and balances his extreme departmentalism would be difficult to square with the Founders’ notions of limited government.
Id. at 322-32. But independent judicial interpretations could hardly be meaningful constraints on contrary executive action if judges conceded that their views were simply
kindly words of advice. As Paulsen acknowledges, the political pressure on the executive to
comply with the judiciary’s judgment is keenest in an instance in which a court declares
that the executive is bound to obey—when it issues a judgment against an executive offi-
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These justifications ultimately fail for largely the same reasons
exclusivity fails as an objective means of getting rights right. Countermajoritarian courts should want to move to some degree toward
minimalism, economizing on exercises of their own power and leveraging the potential for constitutional reasoning by other branches.177
But an exclusive court is a maximalist court;178 not only must it carry
the burden of constitutional interpretation alone, but it must also
reach out to strike down lawmaking that infringes on its prerogative.
Indeed, it may need to overreach even further; if the perception of exclusivity is important, the Court must also police policies by other actors that might be perceived by the populace as a challenge to its
uniqueness.
That problem becomes large if we also consider all of the ways
that the underlying values of any particular right may inform other
legal decisions. For any given right, there are a host of questions—
what remedies for violating the right are available, who can obtain
them, when the interests of repose become more compelling than
vindication of the right, how to forestall possible but hard to detect or
punish violations of the right, to take just a few—whose answers all
depend to one extent or another on the meaning and purpose of the
underlying constitutional right and on how to balance that right
against competing interests. We commonly think of all or most of
those questions as matters of “enforcement” and not constitutional
interpretation per se. Sooner or later, people will start wondering
how “exclusive” the courts really are if they allow other actors to
make what surely amount to fundamental decisions about the meaning and scope of the constitutional rights courts supposedly are solely
qualified to interpret.179 Courts will have to either expand their oversight to meet that expectation or acknowledge that constitutional
reasoning can be shared. Ultimately, exclusivity becomes imperial
overstretch, which collapses the very project the court is engaged in.
It is also likely, as discussed above, that cooperative interpretation is a better means to the same end. As Professor Waldron has argued, moral claims about the collective social meaning of community
membership are more compelling when they arise out of the community as a whole or from diverse and deliberative bodies drawn from
cer. Id. at 301. It follows that a court’s broader claim of power to bind other actors with its
declarations increases the pressure on those actors to obey and thus more effectively
checks their behavior, even if they do not themselves regard those declarations as strictly
binding. But see Alexander & Schauer, Extrajudicial Interpretation, supra note 18, at 1365
(claiming that other branches pay a political price for defying judgments but not for enacting unconstitutional laws).
177. See Post & Siegel, supra note 13, at 516-19.
178. See Whittington, supra note 63, at 796.
179. Cf. Dorf, supra note 10, at 53 (noting that the processes of determining the meaning of a legal rule and deciding how far it should extend are very similar).
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the community and not from a narrow group of elites.180 Additionally,
the public will become more informed and activated by a project it
shares in than by a result that is announced by a distant herald.181
And for obvious reasons, outcomes that are more sensitive to prevailing norms are less likely to generate resistance than those that are
merely hypothesized by judges.182
It could be argued, though, that a judicial rhetoritician can reduce
these costs by identifying subsidiary “rights” questions and other cooperative opportunities as something other than “constitutional,” so
that allowing agencies or Congress to participate does not interfere
with the Court’s rhetorical stance.183 Indeed, Boerne arguably adopts
this approach; as I have argued elsewhere, the Boerne rule does not
appear to extend to congressional enactments that, while probably
enacted in order to effect a constitutional ideal, are formally justified
as an exercise of ordinary policymaking under the Commerce Clause,
not as interpretations of the Constitution.184 I still think that is basically right. If a court is not obliged in the course of reviewing or enforcing a regulation to acknowledge the legitimacy of the other
branch’s constitutional reasoning, it can cling to its exclusive rhetorical posture. Even for legislation that is plainly constitutionally inspired, a court can essentially take the attitude, “well, sure, that is
what they say the Constitution means, but we do not have to determine whether that is right or even a proper ground for their consideration, since the regulation can be sustained or applied on other
grounds.”185

180. JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 79-80, 105-18, 136-38, 141 (1999).
181. See Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the
Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411, 412 (2000); Susan P. Sturm,
The Legacy and Future of Corrections Litigation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 639, 721 & n.389
(1993).
182. That is not to say that cooperation means deference to popular pressure. My claim
is that cooperation gives us better insight not only into actual preferences but also into hypothetical or ideal preferences. We can guess about how people would behave in some unreal state, but the best tests of our suppositions will often come from real-world situations
that may reflect one or more features of the ideal. Thus, the political market’s shadows, although distorted, may give us some sense of the shape between the fire and the wall.
183. See Alexander & Schauer, Extrajudicial Interpretation, supra note 18, at 1385;
Dorf, supra note 10, at 73 (proposing that courts might designate some portion of an announced legal norm as experimental). Professor Waldron argues, though, that these types
of rhetorical maneuvers tend to reduce the quality of a court’s moral judgments. See Waldron, supra note 42, at 140, 142.
184. Galle, supra note 74, at 219. Except in the minimal sense, discussed earlier, in
which all statutes begin with a constitutional decision about the scope of the lawmakers’
appropriate power.
185. It is worth noting that this approach puts substantial theoretical pressure on the
lines a court draws around its zone of exclusivity. If exclusivity is said to be justified because courts are uniquely suited to resolving questions of fundamental justice, then many
statutes not formally grounded in the Constitution will nonetheless appear to require judicial exclusivity.
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The utility of this sleight is fairly limited. The Court still must
deal with regulation that would look to the public like an effort to
evade its exclusivity requirement, because to be seen to tolerate
transparent subterfuge would be the equivalent of ceding its unique
authority. There is a similar problem with granting a blanket exemption to regulation that only “enforce” or “implement” constitutionally
guaranteed rights, rather than interpret them.186 The actual scope
and effectiveness of a rule depend upon how it is implemented. Exclusivity will seem a fairly thin rhetorical straw on which to rest judicial authority if courts let other political actors decide the extent to
which considerations of a constitutional right displace private ordering or ordinary government policy decisions. And, as I have just mentioned, actually deciding problems of enforcement will usually involve analyzing the meaning of the underlying right and its importance relative to other policy considerations, as in the trade-off between repose and vindicating the right offered by statute of limitations questions. However these issues are labeled, it will be clear at
least to close observers that they involve constitutional reasoning.
The name game also would not likely save two important tools of
cooperative interpretation: avoidance and prophylaxis. Avoidance is
the canon of statutory interpretation in which a court will select a
permissible but syntactically less-favored reading of a statute where
the more favored reading would raise serious constitutional questions.187 Prophylaxis is the use of preventative or preemptive rules—
classically bright-line, judge-made rules—that aim to deter or otherwise foreclose potential constitutional violations.188 The Miranda rule
is the prototypical example.189 Avoidance and prophylaxis are cooperative because they invite, or at least permit, responses by the political branches.190 Congress or an agency can respond to an avoidance interpretation by asserting that it in fact intended to press close
against the line of unconstitutional conduct.191 Likewise, because
prophylactic rules are said to be a sort of constitutional common law,
they are at least in theory defeasible by statute.192 I have summarized elsewhere the considerable virtues of avoidance as a technique
for enforcing constitutional rights. Among others, the technique permits a court to further the values underlying a particular constitutional rule without ruling out political responses that might contrib186. See Dorf, supra note 10, at 73.
187. See Schauer, supra note 38, at 1949.
188. See Monaghan, supra note 46, at 21-22.
189. Id.
190. See Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003,
1005 (1994); Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4,
88 (1996).
191. ELY, supra note 55, at 4-5.
192. Monaghan, supra note 46, at 23, 29-30.
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ute to the court’s understanding of what the rule means and how it
should be implemented.193 Prophylaxis can function similarly.194 Under both of these methods, the constitutional right in essence unfolds
into two parts, one exclusively judge-made, the other initially judgemade but open to political development.195
This close relationship between core rights and cooperative applications of rights, however, is precisely the problem for the traditional, rhetorical basis for exclusivity. Once it is recognized that
avoidance and prophylaxis are both really forms of constitutional
elaboration, they come into obvious tension with the idea of judicial
exclusivity.196 This would be true regardless of whether as a semantic
matter we called one half of the right “constitutional” interpretation
and the other half “statutory” interpretation or judicial common law.
It is still obvious that cooperation is cooperation and not exclusivity.
Courts will have a tough time selling the idea that only they are competent or trustworthy enough to craft constitutional policy, but that
Congress and agencies can, ahem, also craft constitutional policy.
In sum, what I have called the traditional account of judicial
rhetoric posits that judges use the language of rights in order to stir
political support for or pacify opposition to their positions, or to lay
claim to moral obligations to obey the law. This rhetorical posture is
superficially stronger when judges can say that they, and they alone,
are the authoritative interpreters and elaborators of rights. But in
practice exclusivity undermines judicial effectiveness by overextending it, and it compares unfavorably to shared interpretation in
achieving the same ends.
B. Exclusivity as an Element of the Constitutive Rhetoric of Judging
We saw earlier that institutional ideology can be a significant influence on how policymakers behave. In this Part, I suggest that traditional analysis of judicial rhetoric overlooks the significance that
judicial language may play in constructing and reinforcing an ideology of judging. It is true, I argue, that such rhetoric is a tool for facilitating principled judicial decisionmaking, but it acts in the main

193. Galle, supra note 74, at 205.
194. See Dorf, supra note 10, at 71.
195. See Coenen, supra note 96, at 1862-66; Galle, supra note 74, at 205-06; Levinson,
supra note 23, at 885; Tracy A. Thomas, Congress’ Section 5 Power and Remedial Rights,
34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 673, 694-95 (2001); Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1551-52,
1594-99 (2000); cf. Monaghan, supra note 46, at 21-22 (arguing that constitutional rights
may include a judge-made “common law” that is based on the Constitution but is open to
experiment by other actors).
196. Cf. Dorf, supra note 10, at 66 (stating that judicial rules sometimes have to be uniform in order for the court to be a credible enforcer, as in the case of individual rights).
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not on the public, which may be relatively indifferent to judicial language, but rather on the judges themselves.
Let us begin again with the modest assumption that judges want
to realize their own goals. For some judges, that may include a commitment to principled defense of constitutional rights, second-order
preferences, and so on. Even self-dealing judges will want to encourage other judges, especially subsequent judges on the same court, to
be principled in the sense that they will attempt to decide based on
reasoned elaboration of established constitutional and other judicial
norms rather than current political preferences.197 That behavior will
make it more likely that the gains secured by the self-dealing judges
will remain in place.198 Both sets of judges likely recognize that there
are strong temptations away from the type of principled decisions
just mentioned. I catalogued those temptations earlier: they include
the possibility of reward from outsiders and ideological, practical, or
political sympathy with political actors.
Again, institutional ideology is potentially a powerful remedy for
the temptations of rational self-interest. By institutional ideology, I
mean a kind of secular dharma, a code of behavior for individuals in
particular roles within the institution.199 The ideology works from
both within and without. Social psychology demonstrates it is shameful and painful for human beings to disappoint behavioral expectations, as anyone who has shown up underdressed for a popular social
event can likely attest.200 Similarly, a widely shared view about how
Regulator X should behave creates social pressure on X to conform.201
Role norms have a sort of momentum; observing repeated behavior
builds expectations that it will continue, which in turn strengthens
pressure on the observed to keep doing what he or she was doing.202
197. In using the term “principled,” I have in mind something akin to Dworkin’s notion
of principled interpretation. DWORKIN, supra note 169, at 219-24. But my argument is also
open to the possibility that courts will frame “principled” interpretations more loosely. As I
will explain in some detail a bit later, my argument here depends only minimally on any
particular notion of “principle.” For a discussion of the limits on principle my argument
implies, see infra note 287.
198. That is, even if later judges feel no moral constraint to be consistent with earlier
decisions, the rhetorical burden of explaining their own exercise of authority within the
context of a system that demands reasoned elaboration from precedent will impose significant constraints on the available realm of outcomes. See Alexander & Solum, supra note
24, at 1627-28; Robert Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New
Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 240-41, 251-52 (1983); cf. Michelman, supra note 111,
at 984-85 (arguing that public expectations for judicial modes of reasoning will lead to a
relatively constrained range of possible outomes).
199. See Freeman, supra note 81, at 562, 570; Rubin, supra note 81, at 767 (describing
the institutional ideology of an elected representative).
200. See sources cited supra note 81. The author has no comment about whether this
example derives from personal experience.
201. See Suchman & Edelman, supra note 80, at 919-20.
202. DAVID I. KERTZER, RITUAL, POLITICS, AND POWER 83 (1988) (arguing that existing
cultural models form the basis for how we learn to shape future norms); Robert Cooter,
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Several studies also show that how behavior is observed and repeated also matters. For example, “rituals” are especially powerful
ways of reinforcing role expectations, perhaps because they are understood as defining features of a given role.203 Thus, ceremonies of
manhood have real impact on altering the behavior of adolescent
boys, and the “trappings” and ceremony of government power reinforce typical behavior by the governors.204 Over time, role-appropriate
behavior becomes not only a response to outside stimuli but also an
internalized norm, as Regulator X comes to share public expectations, practices them, and desires to conform.205 Thus, taking the oath
of office not only exposes her to outside pressure that she will fulfill
the norms of her office, but also makes her want to fulfill them.
We therefore can see judicial rhetoric as an implement for shaping
and reinforcing an ideology of judging.206 The ethos emerges most explicitly when the role of judges is most directly at issue. Begin with
the master craftsman, Chief Justice Marshall. He proclaims not only
that judges can and should interpret the Constitution, but also, “It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is.”207 Another fine example is Justice Harlan’s famous
opinion in Sparf v. United States, a case in which the petitioners had
challenged the rule that they could not argue the lawfulness of their
conduct to the jury.208 The Court rejected their claim, holding that
lawmaking is the province of the court alone:

Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 587 (1998) (noting that norms develop through an evolving consensus about correct behavior combined with active group
sanctions against those who do not comply); Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of
Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 947, 954-55 (1997) (same).
203. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 112 (1973); Andrew J.
Cappel, Bringing Cultural Practice into Law: Ritual and Social Norms Jurisprudence, 43
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 389, 392 (2003); Suchman & Edelman, supra note 80, at 921.
204. See E.R. LEACH, POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF HIGHLAND BURMA 10-16 (1954); James L.
Gibson et al., The Supreme Court and the U.S. Presidential Election of 2000: Wounds, SelfInflicted or Otherwise?, 33 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 535, 543 (2003). See generally KERTZER, supra
note 202, at 102-24.
205. See ELSTER, supra note 80, at 131; TAYLOR, supra note 80, at 57-68; Cappel, supra
note 203, at 430; Suchman & Edelman, supra note 80, at 919-20.
206. Cf. Bybee, supra note 162, at 81, 84 (discussing judicial efforts to claim that decisions are principled and not political); Suchman & Edelman, supra note 80 (noting that
“institutionalists would predict that the structuration of a legal field will generate a stabilizing framework of norms and assumptions regarding what counts as a good, wise or subtle interpretation—and what is seen, instead, as a crass, mercenary, or overreaching political maneuver”).
207. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added). As Paulsen points
out, Justice Marshall also places substantial rhetorical weight on the fact that a judge
“swear[s] to discharge his duties agreeably to the constitution of the United States.”
Paulsen, supra note 17, at 257-58 (quoting Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180
(1803)).
208. 156 U.S. 51, 62-64 (1895).
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Upon the Court rests the responsibility of declaring the law . . .
Under any other system, the courts, although established in order
to declare the law, would for every practical purpose be eliminated
from our system of government as instrumentalities devised for
the protection equally of society and of individuals in their essential rights. When that occurs our government will cease to be a
government of laws, and become a government of men. Liberty
regulated by law is the underlying principle of our institutions.209

Again, Harlan explicitly identifies the rule of law and defiance of selfdealing as a “responsibility” of judging. He raises the stakes even
higher by implying that if judges fail in that responsibility, ordered
society itself would collapse.
Framed by these direct explanations and call to arms, the rhetoric
of principled decisionmaking stakes out a similar claim, although
typically far more implicitly. By justifying case after case based not
upon the personal preference of the judge, but rather by reference to
reasoned elaboration of constitutional principle and existing precedent, judicial rhetoric builds a norm of judicial operation, an expected
mode of functioning that other judges should not shirk.210 That becomes “what courts do.”211 The language of legal reasoning generally,
with its arcane terms of art, gratuitous Latin, and generally alien
structure to popular thinking, constructs itself as a “science” suitable
only for specialists.212 That distinctive language and process helps to
sharpen the definition of the judicial role as something “other,” as requiring a mode of thinking and behaving distinct from ordinary political thought. All of these features help to reinforce our baseline expectation, set up by the structure of the Article III judiciary, that
federal judges will be less receptive to political influence. In fact, as
early as 1834, James Madison argued that the tone of judicial opinions—the “gravity and deliberations of their proceedings,” as well as
the “qualities implied in [the Court’s] members” by its structure—
was a significant factor underlying the Court’s authority.213
And so Supreme Court rhetoric can operate in several different
ways to constrain the behavior of the Justices. The first is somewhat
209. Id. at 102-03.
210. Cf. W. Bradley Wendel, Nonlegal Regulation of the Legal Profession: Social Norms
in Professional Communities, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1955, 1969-70 (2001) (describing possibility
for crafting judicial norms as part of “constructive moral argument”).
211. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Monaghan, supra
note 12, at 14; see also Dan Simon, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Look
Through the Lens of Cognitive Psychology, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 1097, 1135-37 (2002) (observing that judicial reinforcement of the expected mode of legal reasoning has shaped public
expectations that “closed” or logically determinate conclusions are what constitute acceptable legal argument).
212. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 27 (Garland
Publ’g, Inc. 1978) (1783).
213. See KRAMER, supra note 17, at 145-46.
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outward looking; it sets up popular opinion, which creates social
pressure.214 Judicial rhetoric may also raise the pressure the members of the Supreme Court community place on each other to live up
to the norms of their words. Finally, the rhetoric of principle may
have an effect similar to Aristotle’s notion of the practice of virtue:
over time, even pretending to be virtuous may lead us to become
what we pretend.215 Aristotle would have said the transformation
arises out of habit; a modern psychologist might say the transformation would reduce cognitive dissonance.216
Another important audience for judicial rhetoric is other judicial
actors. Consider the difficulty of controlling doctrinal developments
in a system with sixty-three intermediate courts (or more, depending
on whether one wants to count state intermediate courts) authorized
to interpret federal law.217 Given the practical difficulties of direct
supervision and the considerable lag time that attends even direct
error correction, the most useful limitation on lower courts is probably the lower courts’ sense of obligation to follow existing precedent.
Rhetoric thus becomes an important control method in encouraging
lower courts interpreting federal law to abide by principles laid down
by the Supreme Court. Superior courts can also use shame to make
lower courts’ desire to avoid reversal more intense—for example, by
not only reversing but also castigating the lower court for being unprincipled or failing to follow clear precedent. Similarly, rhetoric
might also be aimed at future Supreme Court Justices, in the hopes
that they will come to the Court already having internalized the
norms laid down by their predecessors, or, in joining the Court, aspire to achieve the norm of their new community. That would, again,
likely lead to a more robust sense of precedent, which would allow
present Justices to have longer-lasting impact on the law.
Claims of judicial exclusivity might play a substantial role in reinforcing the psychological impact of judicial rhetoric. Social psychology
214. Admittedly, popular pressure may be a relatively weak constraint on contemporary Justices. For one thing, the general public is probably relatively inattentive to judicial
language, so they may form only very weak impressions about what the Court does and
why. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787,
1829-32 (2005). Part of the rhetoric is that the Court is to be oblivious to public opinion, so
that there is something of a paradox in relying on public opinion alone to constrain how
Justices behave. Thus, I suspect by far the more important set of social expectations is
among the Justices themselves and other close observers of the Court. See Tushnet, supra
note 81, at 454 & n.11.
215. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 22 (Roger Crisp trans. & ed., 2000).
216. “Cognitive dissonance” is the experience of mismatches between an individual’s
knowledge, opinions, and beliefs. LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE
1-3, 9-15 (1957). The theory is that individuals are motivated by the negative sensation of
dissonance to reduce these disuniformities. Id. at 29-31, 263-66.
217. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 91718 (1990); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Protestantism in Theory and Practice: Two
Questions for Michael Stokes Paulsen and One for His Critics, 83 GEO. L.J. 373, 383 (1994).
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tells us that roles, and the norms that accompany them, are often defined by contrast.218 Role definition is especially powerful when membership is highlighted by comparison to an “other,” especially an inferior other.219 Because most people desire superior status, generally,
people prefer to act in the way that defines the higher role rather
than the lower.220 Thus, a perception of membership in an “elite”
class strengthens feelings of cohesion and increases the likelihood of
compliance with the norms of the “elite” group.221
Rhetorical claims of exclusive judicial authority to interpret the
Constitution can function in this way. The Court defines its decisions
as special or principled, and popular or political determinations as a
lesser mode, unprincipled, amoral, untrustworthy, dangerous, and
destabilizing.222 Take the Court’s opinion in Boerne itself.223 In rejecting Congress’s efforts to control the level of scrutiny state courts accorded burdens on religious freedom, the Court invoked Marbury to
suggest that such power would be the equivalent of letting Congress
amend the Constitution. The Court explained: “If Congress could define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment’s meaning, no longer would the Constitution be ‘superior paramount law,
unchangeable by ordinary means.’ It would be ‘on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, . . . alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.’ ”224 Consider the Court’s use of the
Marbury language here. Constitutional law is “superior” and “paramount,” and not, as the Court tells us twice, “ordinary” in the way
that everyday lawmaking is ordinary. Implicitly, then, constitutional
interpretation is different, higher, and better than politics.225 The
body that has exclusive power to make this “superior” kind of law
must itself be elite, and we should aspire to emulate its norms.
Exclusivity might also be required by a self-conscious use of rhetoric to elevate the importance of judicial constitutional interpretation
at the expense of “ordinary” politics. The self-conscious rhetoritician

218. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES 211 (1991); SAMUEL HABER, THE QUEST FOR AUTHORITY AND HONOR IN THE
AMERICAN PROFESSIONS 1750-1900, at 98-99 (1991); CHARLES TAYLOR, THE ETHICS OF
AUTHENTICITY 46-47 (1991); McAdams, supra note 78, at 357.
219. See Bybee, supra note 162, at 33; McAdams, supra note 78, at 357.
220. See Kahan, supra note 78, at 354-58; McAdams, supra note 78, at 355-65; Julian
Pitt-Rivers, Honour and Social Status, in HONOUR AND SHAME: THE VALUES OF
MEDITERRANEAN SOCIETY 19, 22 (J. G. Peristiany ed., 1966).
221. See James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological
Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 99.
222. See Tushnet, supra note 81, at 453.
223. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
224. Id. at 529 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)).
225. Cf. Bybee, supra note 162, at 85 (discussing scholarly claims that there is a divide
between “high politics” of judging and “low politics” of “mere partisan favoritism”).
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should recognize that building the status of courts diminishes the
status of other policymaking institutions. One consequence may
therefore be less principled behavior in those institutions. Thus, if
the Court wants to prevent unprincipled constitutional interpretation, it may well want to prohibit such interpretation by the branches
whose capacity it has undercut.
This last point implies one significant problem with rhetorical
claims of exclusivity. Critics of exclusivity argue that one of its most
significant costs is that it may degrade the quality of constitutional
deliberation by nonjudicial actors.226 As I have just described, rhetorical justifications of exclusivity is an important mechanism for
how that might occur; rhetorical exclusivity lowers public and internal expectations of the political branches’ capacity for principled interpretation, including in their purely internal deliberations. That
should be a concern at least for public-minded courts.
More problematic still, neither of the above uses justify exclusive
judicial authority over all of constitutional law. Contrasting constitutional interpretation with ordinary politics does strengthen the roledefining force of judicial rhetoric, but so, presumably, would contrasting a subset of constitutional law. Why couldn’t the Court highlight a
handful of rights, or portions of rights, that involve fundamental and
compelling moral judgments, or highly elusive second-order preferences, and contrast only those select handful with everyday policy?
Indeed, the Court’s rhetorical claim that its exclusive constitutional
realm is “superior” and “paramount” would seem a little ridiculous
when that realm includes age limitations for federal officials, procedures for filling a vacant Vice Presidency, Congress’s power to establish post roads, and other similarly quotidian constitutional subjects.227 Of course, one might argue that what makes constitutional
law so unique is the special processes for its enactment, the wide,
popular agreement it requires, the corresponding likelihood that it
represents deep public commitments, and so on.228 My point, though,
is that we could plausibly offer similar unifying stories for less comprehensive subsets of the Constitution, or even for groupings of legal
interpretation that span constitutional and statutory interpretation.
If that is the case, given the costs of exclusivity, including its effect
on internal deliberation by other branches, why not choose an exclusive sphere that also allows some room for nonjudicial interpreters,
and that credits politics with some ability to make principled choices?
226. TUSHNET, supra note 42, at 169-72, 181-82, 194; Post & Siegel, supra note 21, at
1037.
227. See TUSHNET, supra note 42, at 9-12 (distinguishing between constitutional topics
that bear on important questions of justice and national identity and other, more technical
provisions).
228. See Schauer, supra note 56, at 1061.
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Then the realms drawn out for shared interpretation would mitigate
the risk that judges would contribute to a downward spiral of both
internal and external expectations for political reasoning in those areas.
This examination of the particular institutional needs of the judiciary therefore seems to turn up at least a partial justification for a
rule of exclusivity. Although what I have called “traditional” justifications for claims of judicial authority do not support exclusivity, it is
possible that exclusivity could be a strong component in constituting
an ideology of principled judging. But even there the argument for
exclusivity is incomplete; it suggests that although we might want
some field of the law to be exclusive to judges, that field would not
have to encompass all of constitutional law. Nor does the notion of an
ideology-reinforcing rhetorical claim of exclusivity by itself seem to
explain how or where the line of exclusivity should be drawn.
Whether such a line can be drawn, and if so how, is the main subject
of the next Part.
VI. VIVE LE BOERNE?
It now seems that there is no compelling justification for exclusive
judicial authority over constitutional meaning and no rationale for
judicial review that cannot be distinguished when is it applied to exclusivity. Perhaps then we could say that Boerne simply mistakes
Klein supremacy for an antidepartmentalism principle.229 But in
fairness to exclusivists, exclusive judicial control of the whole of the
Constitution may be something of a straw man position. Boerne, after
all, does allow Congress to “enforce” the Constitution.230 As I have argued, that power sweeps in much that in a realist sense is constitutional interpretation. If a present Supreme Court is to give Boerne
the respect it can claim as extant precedent, and our argument is directed to that Court, we likely must also explore the possibility that
there is a principled account of Boerne that explains its actual effect—a regime that, while nominally entirely exclusive, in fact excludes Congress only from portions of the task of constitutional interpretation.
We have to make this inquiry not only out of deference to the
stare decisis value of Boerne, but also because of the significance of
the psychological rhetorical aspect of exclusivity. Recall that one of
the framing questions at the outset of this Article was whether there
229. See Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of
Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 173-74 (1997) (arguing that the Court appears to
have mistaken independent congressional interpretation for an attempt to redefine the
Fourteenth Amendment). Professor Tribe accuses Kramer of the same error. Laurence H.
Tribe, The People’s Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2004, § 7, at 32.
230. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518-19 (1997).
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were any aspects of Merryman and Klein supremacy (which we accepted as highly entrenched) that we would have difficulty disentangling from an antidepartmentalist principle. Rhetorical demands, we
just saw, do seem important to the operation of judicial review, if not
essential components of it. While rhetoric does not require complete
exclusivity, it implies a significant role for at least partial exclusivity.
The question now seems to be whether the competing concerns that
support departmentalism can allow occasional exceptions, or if they
would outweigh the benefits rhetoric may offer judicial review. In the
remainder of this Part, I consider whether partial exclusivity can
withstand the difficulties I have already outlined.
First, partial judicial exclusivity seems to resist the criticisms of
collaborative interpretation.231 Although partial exclusivity is distinct
from most notions of collaboration, it nonetheless could accrue many
of the same benefits. Leaving at least a portion of a right open to political development can give the court an opportunity to gather information about how the right works in different settings and observe innovative approaches to balancing and securing the right over
time and in various communities. To take a very simple example,
suppose a court reserved for itself the meaning of discrimination
based on race but allowed political development of the time period for
filing complaints. The ways that different jurisdictions choose to balance vindication of the right with interests of notice and repose for
defendants could give that court insight into how it might balance
the right against more significant interests of greater constitutional
dimension, as well as a measure of the current moral status of the
antidiscrimination right in each jurisdiction over time. Even that
minor experiment can give the judiciary data on important questions,
such as whether the affected communities slowly accept the right
and elevate it over other factors or whether they find that there is
dwindling need for its enforcement. Partial exclusivity similarly
leaves in place another advantage collaboration offers for “getting
rights right” that we thought would be lost with total exclusivity. If
agencies can elaborate on some rights some of the time, they would
allow courts to utilize remedial measures ordinarily unavailable to
them, and more generally to extend at least in part the courts’ capac-

231. For the most part, collaborative theorists make no exception to their argument
that exclusivity is inconsistent with the benefits of collaboration. See supra note 22. One
notable exception may be Professor Dorf, who does argue for allowing courts to designate
part of their opinions “not experimental” and therefore off limits to deviation by politics or
lower courts. I discuss what appears to be his rationale for roping off some portion of rights
infra text accompanying notes 233-34.
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ity to protect rights by piggy backing on the agency’s rights interpretation and enforcement.232
Settlement, too, may have some value if enforced only in a few
constitutional areas. In fact, settlement seems somewhat more coherent as a judicial strategy when it is invoked selectively. Although
settlement obviously represents an important set of values, it is hard
to accept why it should be the single preeminent value.233 A partial
exclusivity could be modulated to preserve finality of judicial decisions in those areas where settlement seems to outweigh other considerations, as where the underlying right is very controversial, so
that further “percolation” would be more divisive and wasteful than
useful, or where those who are protected by the right are very dependent on its predictability. For example, as others have observed,
criminal defendants (and potential defendants) are especially vulnerable to weakening of the rule of law, so that perhaps criminal
trial rights and the like should have some zone that is not prone to
evolution.234
Remember also that I argued earlier that allowing agencies to interpret on a “blank slate,” or in areas of novel application, could combine some of the merits of experimentation with some incremental
legal stability. In the end I rejected that possibility as inconsistent
with a commitment to maximal stability. But if we viewed settlement
as one among several values, whose importance varied depending
upon the context of the right being stabilized, we might in many instances be willing to accept the difficulties of distinguishing between
different acceptable modes in exchange for the greater flexibility they
offer.
For similar reasons, criticism of the settlement function is less biting once there is no need to establish that settlement is superior to
any other value. Exclusivity, as discussed above, may not actually be
that settling, because relatively small amounts of disobedience can
snowball, and in many cases exclusivity will only submerge debate
about values under a layer of technobabble. These are serious concerns for an absolute claim of exclusivity, which has to establish the
preeminence of stability over all conditions despite obvious rigidity
costs. But they are easier to accommodate when settlement is only a
factor to be balanced in deciding whether to make a particular right
or portion of a right exclusive to the judiciary; in some instances the
232. See Galle, supra note 74, at 227-28; Brian D. Galle, Can Federal Agencies Authorize Private Suits Under Section 1983? A Theoretical Approach, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 163, 21718 (2003).
233. See Alexander & Solum, supra note 24, at 1632-34; Peabody, supra note 17, at 7576.
234. See Dorf, supra note 10, at 66-67; cf. Neuborne, supra note 18, at 1000 (arguing
that exclusive judicial interpretation of the Constitution protects the politically powerless).
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lessened settlement will still be enough (perhaps along with other
considerations) to merit exclusivity, but in many other instances it
will not. It may be that settlement will offer a justification for exclusivity, even in combination with other factors, only when it appears
that ordinary judicial review will not adequately settle the law.
On the other hand, the relative malleability of partial exclusivity
may be a problem for the rhetorical-psychological uses of exclusivity.
In order for exclusivity to function as a rhetorical tool for defining judicial ideology, it must define that ideology relatively coherently. In
the abstract, one supposes, it might be possible for strongly embedded and reinforced but illogical traditions to persist over time. Maybe
for a time some cultures could accept judicial claims that interpretation from 9:15 to 11:15 a.m. each morning is special, or that arguments considered after inhaling the smoke billowing from a hot
spring on an Aegean isle are of particular status that demand a particular mode of behavior. But role definition is an accumulation of
expectations. We frame our expectations with what we already
know.235 A tradition that explains itself coherently and convincingly,
that accords with an existing sense of the world, of logic, and of justice, is more likely to ring true with its audience, and in turn more
likely to take root and remain persuasive over time.236 Certainly at
least in a modern, Western, post-Enlightenment culture there is an
expectation that justifications for public policy must be grounded in
reason.237 And, for the most part, Dworkin is right when he says that
our expectation of reason also entails an expectation of consistency
and a hostility to what he calls “checkerboard” solutions—in my example, the illogic of 9:15 a.m.238
Further, the fact that the goal of establishing a judicial ideology is
to instill a desire for principled decisionmaking may demand a principled definition of the scope of that ideology. An act of principled interpretation often begins not with the four corners of the individual
question presented, but with an analysis of the role of the interpreter
within his interpretive community.239 In other words, in the ideology
we are hoping will arise, judges will begin their task by asking, “Am I
235. See J. M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 303 n.32 (1998);
DANIEL C. DENNETT, DARWIN’S DANGEROUS IDEA: EVOLUTION AND THE MEANINGS OF LIFE
342-52 (1995); DAN SPERBER, EXPLAINING CULTURE: A NATURALISTIC APPROACH 58-59
(1996).
236. Cf. KERTZER, supra note 202, at 83 (arguing that existing cultural referrants in
our minds dictate how we will accept new possibilities); CLAUDIA STRAUSS & NAOMI QUINN,
A COGNITIVE THEORY OF CULTURAL MEANING 93-96 (1997) (same); Wendel, supra note 210,
at 1969-70 (claiming that notions of honor and shame are better constructed through a system of reasoned moral consideration).
237. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 331-33 (1980);
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 24 (1993).
238. DWORKIN, supra note 169, at 178-84.
239. See Fallon, supra note 41, at 147-48.
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the kind of person who is bound by the kinds of obligations that
judges have, and what does that set of obligations require of me in
this case?” If that task is fouled up at its outset by problems of incoherent or unprincipled dividing lines between what is or is not privileged and principled, then judges’ confidence in the definition and in
their mission will weaken. That may make the whole endeavor impossible in the long run.
So the question for partial exclusivity becomes whether it is possible to draw a principled or coherent line other than by declaring that
“it is a constitution we are expounding.”240 That line, I have said, has
some weaknesses, but also has the considerable strength that it appeals to the notion of courts as the faithful agents of the ancient authors of a uniquely authoritative text. At the same time, a workable
partial exclusivity could be sustained with another line, perhaps one
that begins by asserting that there is a divide between ordinary differences of opinion and disputes about fundamental matters of value.
We might offer any one of several fairly coherent distinctions between the two, as perhaps a libertarian ideal of individual autonomy,241 Rawls’s suggestion that a fundamental value is one that
should not be subject to majority preference,242 or Dworkin’s somewhat correlative claim that fundamental rights are in the main those
required by equal regard for all individuals.243 The problem with
these examples is that taken alone they would also extend to many
statutes. That produces a logical difficulty: How can a court claim
that it alone can interpret the proper scope of a right when that right
is embedded within a policy that was initially established by the very
body the court will claim is not an authoritative interpreter of the
right? Would the entire enactment be void?
Partial exclusivity might avoid this dilemma by combining the two
rationales: courts should preserve those fundamental principles established by a diverse, numerous, and highly activated past body
politic. For example, we could say that “what courts do” uniquely is
to elaborate the “thin” Constitution.244 We could further claim that it

240.
241.
242.
243.

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819).
See, e.g., DAVID BOAZ, LIBERTARIANISM: A PRIMER 16-19 (1997).
See RAWLS, supra note 130, at 180-94, 475-80.
RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION,
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 122-23 (1994).
244. That result would be the negative image of Professor Tushnet’s postulate that
“thin” constitutional reasoning is best suited for popular constitutionalism. TUSHNET, supra note 42, at 185-87. Tushnet describes the “thin” constitution as that portion most important to our sense of justice and national identity. Id. at 11. He remains skeptical,
though, that courts should have interpretive supremacy (in either the Klein or antidepartmentalist sense) over even those areas. Id. at 9-12, 163. Alexander and Solum appear to agree somewhat, at one point suggesting that settlement is a more compelling
value when the issue at stake is simply one of those “provisions that organize the federal
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is the definition of these rights that is most fundamental. As the interpreter moves from considering the “core” rights to evaluating how
the right relates to real-world policies, her decision departs from the
unique authority of the judiciary and becomes more like “thick” constitutional choices about more quotidian policy decisions.245
Many might object that this resolution is unsatisfying because it
seems arbitrarily to omit some portions of the Constitution. The
choices of which values are “higher” and worthy of special protection
might seem arbitrary, or at least subjective.246 The same would be
true of claims about what decisions courts are most “competent” to
make—again, competency can not be defined in the abstract, detached from subjective measures of good or effective outcomes.247 In
contrast, faithful agency to the whole of the document offers a
straightforward rhetorical claim to producing “right” answers, in the
sense that the question of the document’s meaning is basically an objective historical question.248 But, pace Scalia and St. Augustine, historical interpretations of texts are subjective encounters between the
interpreter’s values and the semantic possibilities of the text and
meta-text.249 In any event, partial exclusivity does not need to conclusively reject originalism or faith in constitutional “right” answers. It
need only show that either view—originalist or deconstructionist—is
internally consistent and therefore capable of sustaining a principled
judicial ideology. There is nothing in this critique that would suggest
otherwise.
Another possible objection is that the dividing line between what
is exclusive and what is not, under any proposed subset of the Constitution, will rarely be bright. Perhaps, this argument goes, that ungovernment” rather than, presumably, more value-laden choices. Alexander & Solum, supra note 24, at 1632.
245. Professor Monaghan urges essentially this same approach to Klein supremacy.
Monaghan, supra note 46, at 33-34.
246. See TUSHNET, supra note 42, at 186.
247. A similar objection could be made to the suggestion by Professors Alexander and
Solum that only those parts of the Constitution wherein “a court will be superior to other
institutions in reaching the right answer” should be settled. Alexander & Solum, supra
note 24, at 1633.
248. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 3, 10 (1971); Monaghan, supra note 59, at 723; Antonin Scalia,
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 854-55, 863 (1989). But see Morton J.
Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 99-100 (1993) (describing originalist arguments as misguided searches for objectivity).
249. See, e.g., JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 9-10 (1996); J. M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal
Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743, 744-46, 761-64 (1987). In fairness to Justice Scalia, he seems
perfectly aware of this counterargument, but prefers his own view because it tends to limit
the discretion of judges. See Scalia, supra note 248, at 862-63. This illustrates nicely the
point that the choice of interpretive method itself is contingent to some degree on the interpreter’s value preferences.
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certainty will weaken or even fatally undermine the definition of the
judicial role. It is important to recognize, though, that the possibility
of principled disagreement at the margins of judicial authority is not
the same as incoherence in the definition itself. Principled interpretation can survive disagreement about difficult cases without undermining the force of the underlying principles.250 In most cases, the
lines will be clear, and in those where it is not, judges will still be
able to recognize the liminal decision they are making as one that is
consistent with the overall project of the judicial ideology. Furthermore, the line between “constitutional” cases and all others is not
necessarily that bright either.251 Recall again our discussion of new
applications, modes of enforcement, and so on. Are these “constitutional” questions? Probably so, but sometimes it will not be easy to
say for sure.
In addition, there are significant advantages to having a line that
is not terribly clear. Having a bright line would make more work for
the Court in striking down efforts to evade its exclusivity requirements. The brightness of the line would make it more likely that evasions would be recognizable as evasions and, for the sake of judicial
credibility, demand judicial response. Economizing on judicial invalidation might extend judicial capacity to do other countermajoritarian
work.252 Blurry lines also probably have a stronger deterrent effect,
because an agency that does not want to waste its efforts will not
want to venture into the “DMZ” on the borders of exclusivity unless it
is strongly committed to an outcome that requires the trip.253 That,
too, economizes the Court’s efforts. Leaving a bit of uncertainty also
reduces the amount of dirt that the Court, by elevating its own status
in the privileged area, throws on the capacity of other branches to
engage in that form of constitutional reasoning. Since such reasoning
is probably inevitable in some internal, largely unreviewable decisions by the political branches, it would be better to leave open as
much ground as is consistent with the Court’s obligation to itself.254
250. See Monaghan, supra note 59, at 748-49.
251. See Monaghan, supra note 46, at 33.
252. See Post & Siegel, supra note 13, at 517.
253. Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New
York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 137.
254. This last point also raises another possible objection, albeit from the opposite direction from those we have previously considered. It might be said that partial exclusivity,
like exclusivity generally, is inferior to full cooperation in that it may tend to reduce public
expectations for the capacity of Congress and the executive for constitutional reasoning.
But partial exclusivity does acknowledge that the political branches may be capable of considering implications or applications of a fundamental right in a principled way. And judicial review might be designed in such a way so as to help agency action revitalize its selfimage as a principled decisionmaker generally, and that methodology might benefit the
agency’s unreviewable consideration even of core rights. I leave explication of that design
for later work.
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Finally, partial exclusivity can likely also claim to make a portion
of the traditional Bickelian understanding of exclusivist judicial
rhetoric more persuasive. Recall that the basic problem with that
view was that in entailing a very extensive zone of exclusivity, it
called for an overextension of the judicial efforts it aimed at economizing, and left judges with no effective way to resolve some of the
rights dilemmas it was aimed at resolving. Certainly to the extent
that exclusivity was a component of a judicial claim that courts reach
“right” answers or can alone find the one meaning the authors of the
Constitution intended, partial exclusivity is no help. That claim is
not really consistent with judicial tolerance for experimentation with
the scope or implementation of the underlying right.255 But even partial exclusivity could still buttress the Court that says that its balancing on some particularly fundamental constitutional rights has a
special claim of moral authority. Exclusivity even in select aspects of
certain rights would provide the Court an a cappella voice to lead or
persuade in that area.
In sum, partial exclusivity, at least in the abstract, looks fairly resistant to the criticisms aimed at exclusivity generally. It is reasonably consistent with Boerne’s doctrinal line—“enforcement” or “prophylactic remedies” might describe the margins of where a fundamental rights definition begins to drift into rights instantiation.256
And it actually seems to support some of the goals of judicial review:
strengthening the judiciary’s institutional commitment to preserving
rights; preserving a powerful moral voice for the Court in resolving
difficult questions of justice in balance; and helping the Court to get
some fundamental questions right and settle them rightly. Still,
there are two important questions remaining. How does executive
involvement affect this analysis? And can the vague concept of principled partial exclusivity work in practice? The next two Parts hash
these questions out.
VII. AGENCIES, BUT NOT CONGRESS?
Until now, although I have mostly discussed executive action,
many of my points seemingly could apply equally well to Congress as
they do to interpretations issued by an agency. The reader may reasonably wonder why, then, I chose at the outset to frame my discussion in terms of a rule of administrative law rather than more generally addressing the question of extrajudicial interpretation. The answer, as I explain in this Part, is that there are in fact some significant differences between how courts relate to agencies and how
courts relate to Congress. Probably the largest difference appears in
255. See Monaghan, supra note 46, at 27.
256. See Gant, supra note 62, at 375.
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an explanation for exclusivity we have not yet considered. I describe
it here as “agenda limitation.” Courts may restrict the authority of
other entities to interpret the Constitution so that courts alone have
control over some aspects of the national agenda, or over with what
issues the courts will be forced to grapple. As I argued in an earlier
work, the argument for excluding agencies on these bases is much
weaker than the argument for excluding Congress.257 Because these
points have been discussed at length elsewhere, my treatment of
them here is fairly cursory. In Part VII.B., I try to explain what may
at first seem an oddity: that agencies, which supposedly exercise
power delegated to them by Congress, should at times be able to interpret the Constitution when the legislature cannot.
A. Agenda Limitation
The Court’s opinion in Boerne devotes exactly one sentence to the
issue of federalism.258 Plainly, though, the Court’s ruling has important implications for the federal government’s ability to displace
state or private ordering with national norms.259 That suspicion was
confirmed in a number of cases following Boerne, where Boerne’s
limitations on Congress’s power to “enforce” the Fourteenth Amendment proved the final line of defense against congressional efforts to
remove state sovereign immunity260 or expand entitlements for the
disempowered.261 By reserving for itself exclusive power to control the
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court was able to reduce
Congress’s ability to nationalize its policy goals.262 Put another way,
judicial enforcement of federalism values may be a justification for
exclusivity at least over rights that might tend to expand the power
of the federal government at the expense of states.
In another work I have argued that judges generally do not need
to prevent agencies from trammeling on the values of federalism.263
Judicially enforced federalism is not aimed simply at constraining
national lawmaking. If it were, then one would expect identical limitations on legislation under both Section 5 and the Necessary and
Proper Clause. Instead, the Court’s concern is mainly with legislation
where it perceives some flaw in the political process that would interfere with the accountability of federal and state officials for their re-

257. Galle, supra note 74, at 222, 227-28.
258. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997).
259. See McConnell, supra note 229, at 192-94.
260. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 80-83 (2000).
261. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001).
262. Evan H. Caminker, “Appropriate” Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers,
53 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1187 (2001); Post & Siegel, supra note 13, at 508.
263. Galle, supra note 74, at 193-96, 222.
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spective decisions over time.264 I contend, however, that the nature of
the relationship between regulated states and regulating agencies is
such that there is not much danger that the state will lose autonomy
or that its voters will be unable to hold the correct officeholder responsible for bad or undesirable outcomes.265 States, especially states
holding a national minority position, are especially powerful administrative lobbyists.266 Voters correctly hold both state and national policymakers to account when a cooperative venture goes sour.267 And
crucially, relationships between agencies and states can be designed
in ways that enhance transparency, activate voters, and give states a
powerful voice in both the goals and implementation of national programs.268
It might be argued that (somewhat paradoxically for a proponent
of unalloyed exclusivity) exclusive agenda control is a necessary incident of a more generally experimentalist regime of constitutional interpretation. For example, Professor Dorf has suggested that the Supreme Court could use federalism in the Brandeisian sense, prohibiting national legislative solutions so that states can experiment with
a variety of alternative approaches to the same sets of rights questions.269 One weakness of this proposal is that the judiciary alone is
unlikely to be able to sort out the varying results in a way that produces genuinely better outcomes. Indeed, in his other writings Dorf
prefers a refereed experimentalism, in which some central political
authority can collate all the data that the various experimenters produce, analyze it, offer benchmarks for comparison, suggest best practices for emulation, help to develop incentives for the participants to
achieve yet better outcomes, and provide overall policy guidance
about the goals of the experiment.270 In correspondence with this author, Professor Dorf agreed that he would qualify his exclusivity argument with the addition that, if either Congress or an agency were
going to serve this centralizing function, the Court should not prohibit its interpretations.271
But it seems far more likely that agencies, not Congress (and certainly not courts) are best equipped to carry out that function. Agencies already have the diversified national bureaucracy, experience in
continually revising standards to match rules (and vice versa), con264. Id. at 220-22.
265. Id. at 222.
266. Id. at 194-95, 222.
267. Id. at 200-02.
268. Id. at 196.
269. Dorf, supra note 10, at 9, 60-61, 64-65.
270. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 314, 321 (1998).
271. Email from Michael Dorf, Professor of Law, Columbia Law School, to author (Oct.
26, 2004, 22:06:04 EST) (on file with author).
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trol over sources of state revenue, and other tools that would be useful for the task.272 Agencies deal with day-to-day problems of administration; therefore, their information is current and closer to “the
ground.”273 Of course, over time Congress might (if it had the inclination) develop some similar skills and attributes. But the more fundamental point is that in the end Congress’s binding authority issues
only through legislation, which is difficult to enact, whereas agencies
have a choice of many more nuanced tools for furthering their
goals.274 That characteristic produces a large difference in inertia and
attentiveness to ongoing concerns.275 Congress is often slack and slow
to respond, while agencies are more nimble.276
There is a similar explanation for why agencies are also considerably less affected by another form of agenda control. One explanation for Boerne and other complementary Court decisions is that the
Court is sometimes reluctant to assume authority over highly controversial or factually difficult litigation.277 By limiting the extent to
which other actors can define legal rights, the Court can shortcut efforts to force it to confront constitutional dilemmas it would rather
avoid. These concerns seem fairly reasonable for rights-defining legislation. Legislative inertia might often leave the Court to resolve the
most difficult technical problems or impose on the Court the burden
of taking responsibility for a controversial outcome. In contrast,
“[t]he day-to-day involvement of federal agencies in overseeing
[rights-defining regulation] gives courts the benefit of the agency’s
technical expertise, and assures that the courts will have a politically
accountable partner in elaborating the meaning of statutes that further constitutional values.”278
Thus, even in a regime that for the most part did not accept exclusivity on other bases, the judiciary might be reluctant to allow some
forms of constitutional interpretation and definition by Congress that
it would not prohibit to an agency. Likewise, within a partially exclusive system, the judiciary might allow agencies more leeway to ponder and define rights than it would permit Congress.
272. Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
1093, 1126-27 (1987) (arguing that agencies are the best institutions to coordinate central
meaning among diverse national approaches).
273. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 270, at 313-14.
274. See David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, The Nondelegation Doctrine and the
Separation of Powers: A Political Science Approach, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 947, 967 (1999);
Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2153-54 (2004).
275. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV.
20, 43-45 (1988); Elhauge, supra note 1, at 2127-28.
276. See Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 274, at 967.
277. See Galle, supra note 74, at 222-24.
278. Id. at 227.
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B. Non-Nondelegation?
If we accept these sets of arguments, we may be left with what
may seem like an odd result. With the exception perhaps of a handful
of special presidential powers, the Executive typically operates only
within the scope of a statutory delegation of power from Congress.279
In effect, though, I have argued that the Executive should be able to
exercise some authority that Congress cannot. How can Congress
give someone else power it does not have itself? One correspondent
colorfully described this view of my argument as the “nonnondelegation doctrine.”
The problem of non-nondelegation (to adopt a felicitous phrase) is
an illusion brought on by the linguistic habits of formalism. Congress
does not really grant power to the executive. Instead, administrative
law limits each branch’s exercise of power according to a set of policy
judgments about which allocation of those powers would best accord
with the design of the Constitution. When we say that an agency acts
ultra vires if it goes beyond what Congress could reasonably have
contemplated in its grant of authority,280 we actually are making a
judgment that allowing the agency to act more freely would threaten
to unleash executive power from the constraints imposed by having
also to satisfy the choices of a more diversely and locally selected
governmental body (that is, Congress). To say that Congress granted
or gave the agency its power is just a shorthand way of saying that
agency action in that particular instance comports with our notion of
how divided government should function. Perhaps the issue would be
clearer if the resulting arrangement was called “reallocation” instead
of delegation.
Thus, it is irrelevant whether Congress could itself exercise a
power that it “delegates” to another body. The real question is
whether exercise of the power by the delegate is consistent with the
competing interests demanded by separation of powers theory. If
these practical reasons suggest that it would be unwise for Congress
279. See, e.g., Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16 (1971); Am.
Bus Ass’n v. Slater, 231 F.3d 1, 6-8 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 558(b) (1994)); SeaLand Serv., Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 738 F.2d 1311, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-55 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring)).
280. See, e.g., Transohio Sav. Bank v. Dir., Office of Thrift Supervision, 967 F.2d 598,
620-21 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citing Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 402 (1989)). I should mention for clarity’s sake that
there are really two distinct concerns in most ultra vires questions: a constitutional separation of powers component and an additional inquiry under the APA whether the agency
has acted “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations.” 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(C) (2000). I limit my discussion in the main text only to the constitutional aspects. I
assume that any particular executive constitutional interpretation would be pursuant to
some general congressional delegation. The nondelegation question I address is whether
the Constitution can permit such transferences of authority.
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to utilize a power, but that with Congress’s consent the Executive
can safely do so, what is the problem with “delegation”? To see a
plain example of this phenomenon, consider the Ex Post Facto
Clause.281 Congress cannot constitutionally impose liability or increase punishment for an offense after it has been committed.282
Courts, however, in interpreting a congressional statute, can read
the law in a way that results in new liabilities or increased after-thefact exposure.283 Yet we could easily say that the power to interpret a
statute is a form of delegation.284 Nonetheless, judicial interpretation
does not contravene the Ex Post Facto Clause, largely because it is
not thought to threaten the kind of vindictive or abusive majoritarianism that legislative enactments would, and because the judicial
system would have difficulty functioning otherwise.285 No one complains that Congress has given courts a power it cannot itself utilize.
This Article, I submit, engages in the same form of functional analysis.
In short, there is nothing about agencies that would support a
presumption that Congress would not wish to delegate to them constitutional interpretive authority. Furthermore, interpretation by
agencies offers courts several advantages generally not available
when the interpretive partner is Congress.
VIII. A METHOD AND TWO EXAMPLES
At this stage, two things seem clear—and, I fear, several other
things may appear anything but. The points of clarity are these:
there seem to be good arguments in favor of a modest zone of exclusive judicial interpretation, but there is no real case for a blanket
presumption that agencies have not been “delegated” the power to interpret the Constitution generally. Even if the strength of the partial
exclusivity position is accepted, it is not obvious (to say the least)
where to draw the borders of exclusivity. I do not propose an answer
to that problem here. This Part, however, lays out, based on what I
have discussed so far, how a court might conduct the exclusivity
analysis in any particular instance. In other words, this Part tries to
reformulate the Boerne rule and the meaning of “arbitrary and capricious” for use in the review of agency action. Because any rule of this
complexity will be hard to grasp in the abstract, I then apply the
proposed rule to two doctrinal areas of particular interest to me: fed281.
282.
283.
284.
John F.
(2001).
285.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 292-94 (1977).
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191 (1977).
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 288 (1985); see
Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 107-08
Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 460-62 (2001).
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eral “disparate impact” regulations under Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and IRS regulation of the political activities of nonprofits.
A. The Method
As the psychology of regulation suggests, there may be an important role for partial judicial exclusivity. By itself, though, social psychological analysis tells us little about which areas of constitutional
doctrine should be exclusive to the judiciary. It is also hard to predict
in advance just how large a zone of exclusivity courts will need to
proclaim. As with more traditional theories of rhetoric, the force and
frequency of rhetorical claims might be lowered if the public prominence of the declarations is higher. Exclusivity might end up being a
matter of a gestalt intuition, managed by the Court across many doctrinal lines. Powerful claims of exclusivity in some prominent cases
might reduce the need for exclusivity in others. Under this view, any
effort to systematize exclusivity or reduce it to meaningful doctrine
looks difficult and perhaps inconsistent with an optimal balancing of
exclusivity with other desirable judicial goals.
This dilemma is a familiar one. In any given case that comes before a court, techniques such as avoidance and minimalist interpretation present the court with a difficult choice between doing its perceived duty in the individual case and preserving its future capacity
for later cases.286 Since this calculus might depend on existing, and
even remotely anticipated, conditions in other doctrinal areas, it
would be almost impossible to formulate in a principled way the conditions under which a court will actually confront an issue and when
it will avoid or minimize it. The court will have a further choice
about how candid it should be about its reasons for the resulting decision.
The social-psychological explanation for exclusivity may avoid this
set of problems. Psychological exclusivity depends on a claim that
judges interpret in a “principled” way. It, therefore, demands that
the limits of where the obligations of principle attach themselves be
defined consistently with the interpreter’s interior values, whatever
their precise content.287 Thus, a judge following that philosophy
286. See Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtue”—A Comment on
Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10-13, 20-22 (1964).
287. Again, I am using “principled” in the limited sense of reasoned elaboration of authoritative text according to a coherent set of values. Of course, one could imagine some
sets of interpretive values that would impose relatively little constraint on the definition of
the judicial role. For example, one might claim that judges are put into place to make law
as they individually please. But there is a limited universe of interpretive methods that
would be consistent with the goals and methods of psychological exclusivity. Psychological
exclusivity is aimed at making it more difficult for other judges to deviate from the rule set
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would have to choose those cases in which she was obliged to apply or
defend her underlying values (that is, obligated not to avoid or share
interpretation) according to reasoned elaboration from those values.
Reasoned elaboration of determinate problems produces “right” answers—a range of possible results that can logically be inferred from
a particular set of premises.288 Of course, not all exclusivity questions
will be determinate, but at least in some cases, reasoned elaboration
of the competing arguments for and against judicial exclusivity over
a particular legal issue will yield an answer. In those cases, it will be
difficult for the judge to set aside the principled answer in favor of
other considerations. She has to have rules and to follow them.289
In short, the social-psychological exclusivist judge must establish
a rule for selecting when to invoke exclusivity and instruct that the
Court follow that rule faithfully. The exact content of any set of rules
will vary depending on the court’s choice of values. But we have already seen in Part VI the framework for laying out those values.
To summarize, the court’s choice works out to a balancing between the benefits of shared interpretation and exclusivity. Shared
interpretation is often better informed, generates more public good
will, may encourage nonjudicial constitutional deliberation, and is
more likely to reflect current preferences. These are formidable advantages, especially when supplemented with carefully designed, but
nonexclusive, judicial review. But for some issues public consideration may not be very useful, as where honest public deliberation is
unlikely or distorted. Exclusivity might help to clear the field for juout by the Supreme Court. It proceeds by claiming that judges engage in a unique form of
reasoning that sets them apart from other political discourse. That necessarily requires a
methodology that is distinct from popular perceptions of how politics work, so that “do
what ordinary politics does” cannot be one of the principled interpretive methods that the
exclusivist court could select. In addition, the method of interpretation would have to supply some reason why other judges would be obliged to give some weight to the earlier opinion. That will tend to exclude value sets, such as many “critical” approaches to law, that
view law as radically indeterminate except in the eyes of the present interpreter.
288. Keeping in mind that a principled interpreter can accept that there may be alternative sets of “right” answers given a slightly different set of values premises, each of
which may be equally principled.
289. This obligation to establish a rule of exclusivity consistent with interior norms
likely holds even if one competing consideration is the opportunity to further reinforce the
desired public perception of the judiciary. Asking a judge to trade principle now for the
possibility of more principle later seems most likely to result only in cognitive dissonance.
That would hamper, rather than facilitate, the process of internalization the exclusivist
was aiming for in the first place. Further, the judge’s reasons for refusing or demanding
exclusivity in this hypothetical would be inconsistent with the values she claims justify judicial intervention. That means if she were to explain her actual basis for the exclusivity
decision, she would be announcing a decision that on its face is unprincipled. Her choice is
to undermine for the public the judicial norm of principled behavior, or to be disingenuous
about the real reasons for her decision, which would weaken, in the judge’s mind, the notion that she is acting consistent with principle. Either way, the norm of principle is undermined.
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dicial moral leadership or to strengthen judicial appeals to substratum moral commitments that run contrary to the results of political
contests. Settlement might be appealing enough in some cases to
merit some exclusive judicial role, especially if the usual downside of
exclusivity is mitigated by a region of shared interpretation on related issues, so that the court can distribute responsibility and receive ongoing feedback about its choices. Finally, we should give
some heed whether the court needs to use exclusivity for agendalimitation, although that consideration is not very important when it
is an agency that is responsible for the interpretation.
Judicial role definition is also putatively an important benefit of
partial exclusivity. In a sense, social-psychological considerations are
a component of any consistently applied balancing test, because absent the demands of role definition we might be tempted to abandon
consistent application in favor of a more flexible Bickelian model.
But, to the extent that principled balancing alone does not adequately weigh judicial rolebuilding, that factor could be used as a tiebreaker. Ad hoc judgments about the need for more, or more visible,
claims of exclusivity could not fit comfortably in an ostensibly principled balancing. But where there are relatively evenly balanced questions of exclusivity, the judge’s principled test is indeterminate.
Thus, it would still be consistent with the goals of exclusivity to tip
one way or the other depending on the court’s gestalt sense of
whether more or less exclusivity was needed to firm up its image.
There are two other significant considerations that the test would
likely have to account for. First, we would have to ask whether any of
the purposes of exclusivity could be fulfilled more effectively with the
tools of judicial review. For example, Boerne’s “congruence and proportionality” requirement290 may at times accomplish some of the
goals of exclusivity, even where the Court ultimately decides that
Congress was acting within its Section 5 power. A congressional or
agency obligation to analyze in detail the history of the “unconstitutional” practices it is targeting can serve the same moral leadership
function as an exclusive judicial declaration of principle, in that it too
would focus public attention on a problem and encourage informed
deliberation about the problem’s content. Agency deliberation also
gives a reviewing court the advantage of the executive’s fact-finding
power in deciding whether an issue should be settled by the judiciary, or, contrarily, should be kept off the judicial agenda altogether.
Or it can mitigate the Court’s agenda-limitation concerns, allowing
the Court to send a question back to another branch when it wants to
make sure—and make clear to the public—that the other branch
really supports a particular outcome, much like Judge Calabresi’s
290. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997).

2005]

JUSTICE OF ADMINISTRATION

225

concept of the “constitutional remand.”291 These factors should not
weigh in favor of exclusivity when cooperative techniques, such as a
deliberation requirement, can handle them at least as well.
Finally, the Court will have to weigh whether to announce in advance that a particular point of doctrine is part of the indefeasible
core of a constitutional right exclusive to the Court. Professor Monaghan observes that clear demarcations between constitutional requirements and defeasible “constitutional common law” invite more
vigorous experimentation from Congress, which can feel more confident that its efforts will not be laid to waste by a later judicial decision.292 But it may be that the Court will want to be chary about what
is or is not exclusive exactly in order to cut back on experiments that
might wander close to the line. Thus, the decision whether to announce in advance will present a balance of values akin to the longstanding trade-offs in avoidance generally: planning and certainty for
the public versus defense of the underlying legal right. As with questions of avoidance, I suspect that decision will vary in each case.
But all of this is terribly abstract. Can it actually work in real
controversies? In Parts VIII.A. and VIII.B., I try to show that it can.
B. Disparate Impact Regulations: An Example of Cooperation
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964293 makes it illegal for state
actors intentionally and invidiously to discriminate based on race.294
Title VI further authorizes federal agencies to enact regulations to
ensure that state entities doing business with the federal government do not discriminate.295 Many of these regulations additionally
provide that those who receive federal funds from a given agency
cannot enact or maintain policies having a “disparate impact” on racial minorities.296 The Supreme Court’s 2001 opinion in Alexander v.
Sandoval, though, suggested strongly that these regulations might
be invalid as beyond an agency’s power reasonably to interpret the
mandate of Title VI,297 which resembles in form Congress’s power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. I have argued elsewhere that
this aspect of Sandoval is difficult to understand.298 The best explanation seems to be that the Court read the scope of Congress’s dele291. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 738-43 (2d Cir. 1996) (Calabresi, J., concurring),
rev’d, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
292. Monaghan, supra note 46, at 31.
293. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000).
294. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-93 (1985).
295. Id. at 293; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1.
296. Mank, supra note 7, at 518-19, 532-35.
297. 532 U.S. 275, 281-82 (2001); see Mank, supra note 7, at 519-20; John Arthur
Laufer, Note, Alexander v. Sandoval and Its Implications for Disparate Impact Regimes,
102 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1614-15 (2002).
298. Galle, supra note 74, at 174-75 n.60.
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gation to the agencies narrowly in order to avoid the question
whether the prohibition on disparate impact would be within Congress’s Section 5 power.299 Thus, Sandoval is an application of the
canon discussed throughout this Article—whether a court should assume that an agency does not have the ability to interpret the Constitution in parallel with the court.
As I have argued, rather than a blanket presumption against an
agency’s power to interpret the Constitution, courts should instead
attempt a nuanced balancing to determine whether judicial exclusivity in a particular case is actually necessary. Here, beginning with
the values evident in the Court’s existing antidiscrimination decisions, it seems fairly clear that exclusivity is inappropriate.
First, it is apparent that the Court does not see disparate impact
discrimination as the central aspect of some right that it is the duty
of the judiciary to protect. When faced with calls to defend minority
plaintiffs against “unintentional,” unequal outcomes that seem to depend in part on the plaintiffs’ race, the Court has deferred, citing institutional limitations that would make its protection less than fully
effective.300 While the obligations of duty must to some extent be responsive to those concerns, the fact that the Court was willing to confront them in other areas, such as in many First Amendment
cases,301 and not here suggests that disparate impact does not have
the same appeal to the Court’s sense of core rights-protection obligations. Nor is the question of disparate impact quite so central to the
fundamental definitions of equality and distributive justice the Fourteenth Amendment demands as, say, intentional discrimination. To
be sure, disparate impact could be framed as a question of equality—
equality of results rather than equality of treatment. But the Court
seems to see it instead as more of a question of remedy for the core
problems of intentional discrimination. In the Court’s view, prohibiting disparate impact is a fallback method for preventing hidden or
unconscious racism, or a tool for realigning the embedded social results of past deliberate inequities.302 That looks more like the sort of

299. Id. Similarly, Justice O’Connor has argued that an agency’s authority to interpret
and enforce civil rights legislation is narrower than Congress’s Section 5 enforcement
power. Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 613-14 (1983) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring). As Justice Stevens pointed out, this view is contrary to general principles of
administrative law. Id. at 644-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But it is intelligible, albeit mistaken, if it is understood as a Bickelian narrowing of the scope of a delegation to avoid constitutional limits on Congress’s authority.
300. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297-99 (1987); Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 239-42, 248 & n.14 (1976).
301. See McConnell, supra note 229, at 191-92.
302. Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117
HARV. L. REV. 493, 498-99 (2003).
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policy question that principiled interpretation allows a court to share
with other actors.
Most other factors also point against exclusivity. There is no
strong interest in settlement. Indeed, the Court has expressly said
that it wants to allow society to continue to evolve and develop before
it establishes a lasting rule for how best to correct discrimination.303
Furthermore, agency administration mitigates any agenda-limitation
concerns the Court might have.
On the other hand, it is true that unintentional discrimination
seems the sort of problem where the Court’s rhetorical and moral
leadership could be especially powerful. Arguably, exclusivity would
help the Court to command the rhetorical field, focusing more attention on its admonishments. But simply requiring agencies to examine
facts and make findings on the scope of disparate impact discrimination in their field, as well as the appropriate remedies, could have the
same benefit. That, too, would lead to public deliberation and would
establish a set of conclusions from an entity with social prominence,
with the added benefit that it would more directly involve the affected stakeholders. The Court’s supervision of the process could
make all the participants more principled and could lend the outcome
some portion of the judicial reputation for moral leadership.
Therefore, contrary to the suggestion in Sandoval, disparate impact regulations look like an area where exclusivity is not justified.
That implies, in turn, that the Court should permit agencies to regulate disparate impact discrimination. As we just saw however, the
Court might prudently demand that agencies deliberate regularly on
how their various antidiscrimination policies actually function.
C. Tax Exemptions for Religious Organizations Acting Contrary to
Public Policy: An Example of Exclusivity
For the most part, the federal government does not tax the income
of religious organizations or other charities.304 One important exception to this general rule of exemption is that “an institution seeking
tax-exempt status must serve a public purpose and not [act] contrary
to established public policy.”305 Thus, some advocates of campaign finance reform have suggested that the IRS might use its powers to
revoke and otherwise regulate the charitable tax-exempt status as a
tool to discourage what these advocates see as behavior contrary to
public policy, such as various forms of lobbying or other political activity.306
303.
304.
305.
306.

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000).
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983).
See sources cited supra note 5.
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The IRS’s power to declare activities “contrary to established public policy” may be constrained by the Supreme Court’s presumption
against allowing agencies to consider constitutional questions. In Bob
Jones University v. United States, the Court upheld the IRS’s determination that a pair of private religious schools were not entitled to
exempt status because they discriminated on the basis of race.307 Significantly, though, the Court warned that the IRS could make such a
finding “only where there can be no doubt that the activity involved
is contrary to a fundamental public policy.”308 In response to the petitioners’ arguments that the IRS had not been delegated authority to
make such a determination, the Court remarked that the IRS could
properly find a charity contrary to fundamental public policy at least
where “the position of all three branches of the Federal Government
was unmistakably clear.”309 In answer to Justice Powell’s similar
complaint, the Court responded, in effect, that the delegation to the
IRS here was acceptable because Congress had clearly endorsed the
delegation.310 In essence, the question was the same one as the one
we have grappled with throughout this Article: can the IRS be presumed to wield power to make fundamental decisions of justice, especially those turning on interpretation of the Constitution, absent
Congressional authority? The answer, it seemed, was no.311
My analysis thus far shows that the rule of Bob Jones University,
read broadly in this way, is probably wrong. It should not be presumed generally that the IRS, absent a clear delegation, lacks authority to contemplate constitutional questions. Nor should we universally limit the IRS’s understanding of those questions strictly to
what courts have previously held.
At the same time, a more methodical analysis suggests that the
Court was likely right that exclusivity is the right rule on the facts of
Bob Jones University. We could begin, as some of the amici did, by
framing the case as another application of the disparate impact regulations question: shouldn’t the IRS have been free to take the view
that its de facto support for a discriminatory institution infringed on
equal protection values?312 But an important distinction between the
Bob Jones University situation and disparate impact is that Bob
307. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 579-85.
308. Id. at 592.
309. Id. at 598.
310. Id. at 598 n.23; see id. at 610-11 (Powell, J., concurring) (“[T]he balancing of these
substantial interests is for Congress to perform.”).
311. It is not entirely clear, though, what the result would have been if only one other
branch, be it legislative or judicial, had previously agreed with the IRS’s view.
312. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 599 n.24 (noting that amici had urged the Court to find
that a grant of the exemption would itself have been a violation of equal protection); id. at
622 n.4 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that exemption was not unconstitutional because it was merely a “facially neutral” statute).
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Jones University involved a direct conflict between two constitutional
rights. At the tail end of its opinion, the Court also held that the government’s “overriding” interest in remedying discrimination outweighed the school’s asserted free exercise right to set admissions
and interracial dating policies based on the religious convictions of
its members.313 As a result, the IRS’s decision was not only a decision
about equal protection, but also a decision about how to accommodate competing claims of racial justice and religious liberty (albeit
liberty exercised in a rather loathsome fashion). The Court’s need to
preserve for itself sole authority to resolve claims of competing rights
seems one of the strongest justifications for exclusivity.
Furthermore, claims like those put forward by Bob Jones University seem, for this Court, to command a place closer to its notion of
apolitical rights not to be shared with the other branches. It is true
that, since the time of Bob Jones University, the Court has largely
gotten out of the business of balancing religious liberty against the
government’s interest in enforcing facially neutral laws of general
application, and expressly relegated the complaints of those burdened to the political process.314 But that is in part because the Court
would like to distance religion from official government consideration
of the importance of any particular religious obligation, especially
since it is likely that the practices of unpopular or obscure religious
organizations will be given scanter weight.315 The University’s claims
also to the modern eye could have a strong Boy Scouts of America
flavor of “intimate association” on top of the pure free exercise right
it argued in 1983.316
Putting all these considerations together, I think the Court would
probably (under this Article’s method) invoke exclusivity on a similar
set of facts today. Unless the IRS’s reading of the Fourteenth
Amendment was the same as the Court’s, it would be invalid, despite
Congress’s authorization. It is not at all clear, though, that this same
conclusion would apply to IRS regulation of the political activities of
exempt entities.317 It would depend on how strong the entities’ free
exercise and free association arguments were and how directly, if at
all, they would conflict with whatever view of constitutionallyinspired “public policy” the IRS offered. I leave that difficult question
for future development.
313. Id. at 602-04 (majority opinion).
314. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884-90 (1990).
315. See id. at 886-87.
316. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
317. For an example of one such balancing, see Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v.
United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972). The Christian Echoes court upheld the Service’s revocation of a politically active church’s 501(c) status because, among other reasons,
it held that the resulting First Amendment burdens could be outweighed by the IRS’s interest in avoiding potential Establishment Clause problems. Id. at 857.
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IX. CONCLUSION
Judicial exclusivity, I have argued, can coexist with cooperative
constitutional interpretation between courts and the Executive. By
invoking exclusivity selectively, the judiciary can protect its own institutional interests while at the same time garnering many of the
benefits cooperation offers. It therefore would be a mistake for administrative law to adopt a rule, as the tax law arguably has, that
would presumptively reject independent executive interpretations of
the Constitution as a legitimate basis for an agency’s decision. I have
proposed instead a more nuanced balancing test, which courts could
use to channel the competing considerations for and against exclusivity. I believe the test can offer powerful insights into a number of difficult dilemmas, as with its relatively easy resolution of the recently
vexing question of the validity of disparate impact regulations.
At the same time, this Article is just a first step. I have suggested
an answer only to the liminal question of whether an agency should
have any independent interpretive authority. Once we agree that
such authority sometimes exists, there is the secondary, and probably more important, question of how to review the resulting interpretation. That debate has traditionally been framed as a matter of “deference.” But as I have suggested here at times, there are many other
factors at work besides simply the degree to which one institution
should acknowledge the policy insights of another. When should judicial interpretation happen? How can the judicial end of a shared interpretation be structured to achieve judicial goals? What should
judges say about deference in light of their self-perceived need to
claim some ultimate authority?
My work here also suggests an interesting line of inquiry about the
role of other interpreters. State governments sometimes defend state
activity that infringes on one constitutional right by arguing that their
action is necessary to preserve another constitutional right. Virginia,
for example, barred funding for a religious publication at a public college on the ground that funding the organization would have been an
establishment of religion.318 The State of Washington denied some
scholarships to students pursuing a degree in theology for the same
reason.319 In reality, resolution of both disputes might turn on the extent to which the state’s proffered constitutional justification is compelling enough to survive First Amendment scrutiny, despite the fact
that it might describe or view “establishment” differently than the Supreme Court would. Should the Court permit independent constitutional interpretation by states, as well as by the Executive branch?
Again, I leave that difficult question for future work.
318. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
319. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 716 (2004).

